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1.  Introduction 
 
After long periods during which water management implied working against 
nature, to ensure ‘progress’ for mankind, in the last one or two decennia there 
has been a remarkable paradigm shift. Several European countries, including 
the Netherlands experienced floods and risky high waters, caused by rivers. 
Though further improving dikes and embankments has typically been a first 
response, it has also lead to a reconsideration of the basic underlying 
principles of water management. In stead of only containing rivers, the new 
paradigm seeks to make maximum use of opportunities to make nature an 
ally in the strife to stabilize water levels and prevent floods. In the Netherlands 
this new paradigm is accompanied by slogans like ‘space for rivers’, ‘living 
with water’ and ‘building with nature’. The predicted further increase of 
irregular rainfalls caused by climate change on the one hand, and the 
emphasis of the European Water Framework directive on respecting ecology 
and natural river basins on the other contribute to this paradigm shift in water 
management.  
 Working with rather than against nature to ensure human purposes, 
comes however at a price, which is especially relevant in densely populated 
countries like the Netherlands. It almost invariably costs a lot of space. Part of 
the reason behind the creating of ‘unnatural’ interventions in the past was 
precisely the ‘rationalization’ of the use of space. So working with nature also 
poses new challenges to the field of spatial planning. Spatial planners are as 
such not unfamiliar with these kinds of challenges. Many see the integration of 
various spatial claims into productive neighbourships and even multiple uses 
of the same area as their core business. But water managers do not want to 
come by as the eleventh purpose to be integrated alongside ten previous 
ones. They want the water system to be the guiding principle, and water rules 
and policies are backing them in this claim. Of course, realities are more 
complicated and powers sufficiently balanced to get complicated processes 
around each project with which the new innovative paradigm is put into reality. 
This reports deals with two of those processes in order to get deeper insights 
in the role of boundary spanning in the implementation of innovative policies. 
 
The ISBP research proposal specifies that the cases that are studied (the 
empirical domain of the study) will need to have the following characteristics: 
- at the interface of nature and culture; 
- somehow relevant for sustainable development; 
- where conflict is likely; 
- across spatio-temporal scales. 
To the last item we would like to add the cross sectoral dimension, for 
instance enlarging a certain project from merely one purpose or fitting in one 
policy scheme to encompassing implementing more, maybe even many, 
policy schemes or societal purposes. To enable policymaking and 
implementation across scales, across time perspectives and across sectors 
requires a lot of boundary spanning work, labelled here sometimes as 
“administrative coupling”. 
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The case of the origins, planning and implementation of the so-called 
retention area of North and South Meene in the Netherlands – an inhabited 
area – is an example where all the features mentioned are well represented. 
This case will be analysed first in this paper. The second case deals with an 
even bigger intervention, the creation of a 13 kilometres long and 150 to 300 
metres wide river bed to reconnect a system of natural brooks with the 
tributary rivers that ultimately feed into the Netherlands largest fresh water 
body, the Ijssel Lake. This new river crosses a motorway, the Twente Canal, a 
railway and gas pipelines, and transits planning areas under the control of 
three local authorities. Not surprisingly it is called The Breakthrough.  
 
A case study usually begins by telling the “story” of the developments, 
followed by one or more analyses guided by specific questions (Dente, Fareri 
and Ligteringen 1998). The following leading questions will serve to guide the 
analysis of the cases. Each of them is dealt with in a separate subsection:  
1. What is the issue to focus on?  
This is a pre-choice question that is a necessary starting point that cannot be 
derived from empirical observations. In terms of the ISBP project it could be 
a/o. linked to a certain (European policy) innovation. The boundaries of the 
research domain should be sufficiently flexible to enable an open view of the 
boundary judgments of the actors involved. Nevertheless it is important to 
sharpen focus on a certain issue before entering the next step.  
2. What processes developed around this focus? Was there any coupling 
with other issues during these processes, and if so, when and with 
what?  
Coupling with other issues requires that the boundary judgments of the actors 
involved move along with this coupling. This is not necessarily the case.  
3. What were the relevant motivations, cognitions and resources of the 
actors involved? To what extent and how do these factors explain the 
course and results of the process? 
Here Contextual Interaction Theory (Bressers 2004, 2007a) will provide brief 
analyses of the processes.  
4. What is the role of boundary judgments in these factors and the 
process?  
Boundary judgments that differ among actors can cause incoherence and can 
even be a source of conflict. Boundary judgments can be too narrow for the 
adequate use of the innovation or so wide that complexity becomes 
unmanageable and hinders all progress.  
5. What was the interaction with the specific context, the structural 
context (elements of governance and property and use rights and their 
degree of coherence) and / or the wider contexts, like the cultural 
context?  
Here the degree of extent and coherence of the elements of governance will 
get special attention. 
6. What is the role of the receptivity of actors involved in these factors and 
the process? 
The role of receptivity in the process as a whole can in principle also refer to 
the receptivity of the set of actors as a network. In this paper we will however 
concentrate on one crucial actor, the waterboard.  
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7. How did one or more actors manage the incoherencies in boundary 
judgments or the challenges of coupling across spatio-temporal scales 
or sectors involved?  
8. What lessons could be drawn from this experience for other situations?  
This last question reflects the ultimate “how to” nature of the project. In the 
last chapter of this report this question will be given a provisional answer.  
 
The two case studies that form the heart of this report are dealt with in the 
next two chapters. In chapter 2, the first of the two case studies, also some 
explanation of theoretical backgrounds will be given where deemed 
appropriate or necessary. In chapter 3 this will be minimized. In the last 
chapter 4 we will conclude the report with a brief comparison and a 
provisional answer to the last question on “lessons learned”.  
 The full ‘stories’ of the cases will not be told extensively in this report. 
They are well documented by Lulofs (2003) and Hanegraaff (2007), although 
in Dutch. Here we confine ourselves mainly to a re-analysis of these cases 
from the perspective of boundary judgments, receptivity and boundary 
spanning with “convergence mechanisms”.  
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2.  Creating an inhabited retention area: The case of 
North and South Meene 
 
 
 
2.1  The issue 
 
One of the consequences of the warming up of the climate is the increase of 
irregularities in rainfall and consequently river levels. Many water projects are 
attempts to cope with this. Protection against river floods has become more 
and more difficult. In order to prevent the excessive costs – and sometimes 
even impossibilities – of continuously strengthening dikes even for very 
occasional peak levels, while protecting concentrations of people and 
economic value, a new policy has been developed that attempts to lower top 
peak river levels by enabling controlled inundation. Of course the innovation 
here is not that under pressure of a real menace to large urban areas 
deliberately dikes are broken to release the water elsewhere. The innovation 
is that this is not pure crisis management or at most an option in an all but 
hidden disaster plan in the drawer of the mayor, but a policy in which the area 
is actually physically prepared for that function, including means to protect 
inhabitants (and their houses and cattle) when the inundation is effectuated. 
The case analysed here is about an area that has become one of the 
Netherlands first official and inhabited “retention areas”.  
 
The location is in the east of the Netherlands, part of the sub-catchment area 
of Rhine-east, as defined for the implementation of the EU Water Framework 
Directive (see figure 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1, The various catchment area’s in the Netherlands (on the right, 
crossing the German border: Rhine–east) 
 
The tributary river that is relevant for this case study, is river Vecht that flows 
into the IJssel lake in the centre of the Netherlands, just after being merely 
connected to – not even flowing into – the river IJssel, one of the branches of 
the Rhine. “The Vecht is a middle size rain river, which originates in Germany. 
The total length is 167 km, of which 60 km is situated in the Netherlands. The 
Dutch part of the catchment is used more intensive than the German part. The 
size of the Dutch part of the catchment is 2400 km2, the elevation in the area 
ranges from 0 to 83m, but the decline of the Vecht itself is just 10m. The 
average rainfall in the catchment is 730 mm and ranges from 550 mm in dry 
years to 1100 mm in wet years. 35-40% of the precipitation runs off. The 
mean run off at the mouth of the Vecht is 50 m3/s, at low water it is only 5 
m3/s and under conditions of high water it is about 300 m3/s. Most of the 
waters in the catchment have been strongly regulated by normalisation and 
dams. In large parts of the area water inlet from outside the catchment plays 
an important role for agriculture in the summer.”1  
Figure 2.2 shows the Dutch part of the Vecht area. Water management in the 
northern part of this area is under the jurisdiction of the waterboard of Velt and 
Vecht. The case study area is marked with an oval.  
 
 
                                            
1 See www.euroharp.org, accessed September 13, 2007. 
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Figure 2.2, Dutch part of the catchment area of river Vecht (source: 
www.euroharp.org) 
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Figure 2.3, The case study area in a Google Earth image (meandering from 
middle right to lower left is river Vecht, the German-Dutch boundary is in 
yellow) 
 
The story starts when in October 1998 river Vecht, coming from Germany, 
was rising to such an extent that four towns were seriously threatened, also 
because the rising water eroded the stability of protective works. On the basis 
of emergency authorities given by law and a semi-official and for the public 
unknown manual on what to do in these kinds of situations (even suggesting 
this particular area) the decision was taken to prepare the case study area for 
evacuation and deliberate flooding. The area was closed and controlled by the 
police and a crane was already installed on top of the dike to take action. 
Ultimately and by a narrow margin the action could be cancelled.  
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2.2  Processes and coupling 
 
The flood crisis described above and its immediate aftermath can be seen as 
the first of the three processes that make up this story. We will briefly describe 
these processes and discuss which spatio-temporal or sectoral coupling took 
place that required some form of boundary spanning.  
 
Crises and aftermath  
Directly after the flood crisis the inhabitants of the area, mostly farmers, were 
shocked. While before WWII flooding was not an unusual phenomenon, 
protective works had been greatly improved afterwards. The well kept dikes 
around the area proofed to be no guarantee at all that their properties were 
safe. It was completely unknown to the public that in a crisis manual the area 
was designated to be sacrificed if necessary. Although during the 
development of the Vechtvisie (‘Outlook for river Vecht’) (1997) there had 
been some deliberation on the possibility to equip the area to be a designated 
retention area, then the decision was made not to do so in the immediate 
future and only to re-assess this issue after 2002.2 While the crisis 
management was predominantly a matter for the municipality, with necessary 
legal backing from the province, it were the waterboard and the agricultural 
association (GTLO) that took the initiative for a public meeting with the 
inhabitants for consultation about future prospects. The inhabitants demanded 
that such unprepared crises situations would not occur again and that 
measures needed to be taken. The waterboard agreed and made an 
“unconditional promise” that they would equip the area as a retention area 
with all the facilities needed to prevent damage to buildings and people. 
Though as a “process” the crisis and the meeting form a brief episode, it is 
dealt with here because of its crucial importance for the main decision making 
process to follow. It shows that the next and central process did not start at a 
“tabula rasa”. 
 
a) The coupling that takes place here is that the crisis awareness and safety 
concerns of the citizens were linked with the perspective on the possible 
future creation of a retention area, that previously was as much inspired by 
the purpose of nature development as is was by the water safety issue and 
part of the “space for water” policy innovation. Both temporal and sectoral 
boundaries were thus spanned.  
 
 
 
                                            
2 In the Vechtvisie (1997: 55) the use of winter beds is emphasised to accommodate irregular 
water flows and to provide “space for water”. In fact most of the concerns in terms of 
quantitative water management in the trajectory directly after entering across the German 
border were minimum flows in dry summers (p. 60). The possibility to create a retention area 
is however mentioned, including the fact that it is was already a designated area for crisis 
management (p. 78). The idea here was even far more radical: to completely change the 
function of a substantial part of the area to nature (Anerweerd), and use the area for regular 
flooding and storage for dry summers (pp. 84-85). Projected timing is very unclear. While one 
sentence speaks of a ‘high priority’, also – in a cripple sentence – the document states: “The 
realisation for this will possibly be realised after 2020”.  
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Challenges to integrated decision-making  
In the subsequent planning and decision-making process (the main process in 
this case), the central arena became the “Sub-area committee Gramsbergen” 
that was to elaborate the integrated area-oriented policy on the designated 
“precious cultural landscape” Vecht / Regge for this part. This committee was 
already working on this task before the flood crisis. What is new is that the 
development of the retention area became a prioritised and major subject, 
while previously it was postponed to be reconsidered after 2002. In this 
committee the municipality, the waterboard, the province and the agricultural 
association were represented, the last one providing the chair and two 
members, of which one actually lived in the area. The setting of the 
“integrated area-oriented policy” scheme deliberately strives for a lot of 
sectoral policy integration, but also requires that all concrete steps will be 
taken voluntarily by the partners involved, thereby restricting the acceptability 
of using formal powers to a large extent. Rather than going into detail on the 
sometimes cooperative and sometimes turbulent story of this decision making 
process here, we concentrate on some of the main issues.  
 In the committee the discussion initially concentrated to a large extent 
on nature development, arousing the member from the agricultural 
association that also was an inhabitant, who felt that also the quality of the 
agricultural infrastructure in the area should be a main concern. He was 
accused of mixing personal scale interests with the general scale area 
planning discussion and eventually left the committee. This was however for 
the agricultural association a signal to take the inhabitant’s interests seriously 
and it started to make an inventory of the wishes of the inhabitants. This 
proofed important to channel the commotion under the citizens and to mediate 
between them and the waterboard. The wishes concentrated on the facilities 
(impact on living conditions, guaranteed dry access) and financial damage 
compensation (both property value and inundation compensation).  
 In the meanwhile the purpose of a substantial nature development 
(which would have brought subsidies for the project as a whole) proved 
unfeasible, at least in the voluntary context of the area-oriented policy. When 
the province decided not to accept already fallow grounds as part of the newly 
to be developed nature, it effectively de-coupled this sectoral purpose. 
(Salient detail: in the implementation phase, the third of our processes, a 
farmer offered his area to be sold for nature development after all, making a 
re-coupling of the purpose feasible at the very end of the process!) 
 From the European Interreg programme IRMA (Interreg Rhine Meuse 
Activities) in the meanwhile a very substantial subsidy had been obtained, 
together with the ‘matching funds’ from the environment ministry ultimately 
covering approximately half of the expenditure. The programme sponsors 
projects with an integrated approach. “A permanent improvement in high 
water policies and protection can only be achieved through integrated action 
in the fields of water management, spatial planning, economy, nature 
protection and agriculture as well with physical planning”3. So, it fitted very 
well with the integrated approach of the area-oriented policy scheme. The 
main requirement that caused a lot of pressure was that all subsidised 
                                            
3 See http://www.irma-programme.org/a_about/objectives.htm, accessed September 14, 
2007. 
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activities had to be realised before the end of 2001. This was translated in the 
process into an extra effort to keep all relationships in the network, both inside 
and outside of the committee as pleasant as possible, urging the waterboard 
to achieve consensus with the inhabitants on their wishes and on the 
necessary land acquisition. Expropriation was furthermore not an option at 
that time since area-oriented policy is based on voluntariness.  
 A main issue – that popped up unexpectedly and late in the process – 
was the necessity to change the municipal zoning plan. This was a clear 
misjudgement of the waterboard and its advisors (both their own judicial 
advisor and the consultancy firm that it by then had hired to speed up the 
process). The representative of the municipality had spoken before about this 
issue but was not taken very seriously, until in the beginning of 2000 he 
actually threatened to effectively halt all preparatory activities that had started 
by then (the enormous time pressure created overlap with the in principle 
following process of implementation). The waterboard found itself at an 
awkward moment (remember the high time pressure) in a very dependent 
position. Lobbied by (representatives of) local inhabitants, the municipal 
council acted as a defender of the area’s inhabitants interests (even while 
also other parts of their towns would be threatened by flooding), and the 
province refused to step in and use its powers and influence to speed up the 
process. Some inhabitants submitted objections that in principle could cause 
lengthy procedures, likely partly under the guidance of the agricultural 
association. Shying away4 from the option to retreat fully and continue the old 
situation of a non prepared, but still designated area to be flooded when 
necessary to protect towns, the waterboard had no alternative than to agree 
with all demands from the municipality, including some that referred to 
individual farms and a guarantee to compensate all damages. Only then the 
municipality cooperated with special regulations that enabled the start of the 
activities pending the formal approval of the zoning plan5. The necessary 
permits were issued in October 2001, only months before the deadline of the 
IRMA subsidy. Ultimately also the last remaining formal objections were 
withdrawn, again likely under the influence of the agricultural association that 
had the procedures used to exert maximum pressure, but also was aware of 
the fact that stubborn objections by individual inhabitants / farmers could 
endanger the whole project that by now was adapted to the wishes of many.  
 
In this process the following couplings took place:  
b) Inserting the planning of the retention area in the area-oriented policy 
regarding the “precious cultural landscape” implied a broad sectoral coupling 
of flood protection with outlook on physical planning (strangely enough without 
attention for formal physical planning), nature, landscape, and in principle also 
the infrastructure for agriculture. 
                                            
4 This option would however not only not satisfy the waterboards own purposes, but also 
break the “unconditional promise” made to the inhabitants at the meeting directly after the 
crisis.  
5 This text presents the position of the municipality as a single actor. However, there were 
considerable differences between the cooperative civil servants, the mayor and aldermen that 
were especially weary of possible “plan damage” claims, and the members of the council. 
This differentiation explains why the municipality could change so quickly to active 
cooperation once the barriers were removed.   
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c) Later efforts by the agricultural association to channel the wishes of the 
inhabitants lead to the issues of living conditions for inhabitants (“dikes too 
close around houses”), and financial compensation to enter the scene.  
d) The problems with land acquisition for nature development lead to a de-
coupling of this previously very important aspect (only to be saved 
coincidentally in the third, implementation, process).  
e) A large European subsidy (from Interreg) provided much finance but also a 
huge time pressure. So linking temporal scales became an overwhelming 
issue, for the planning, for the next coupling issue, physical zoning planning, 
but also for the building activities (see the following description of the 
implementation process). 
f) While physical planning was already included as a perspective in the area-
oriented policy scheme, the formal physical planning requirements were 
overlooked until they were forced upon the process, making coupling with 
those under high pressure unavoidable.  
 
Working under pressure: no time to lose 
Under the given time pressure it was no surprise that the actual 
implementation (specifying and construction) had to start while the planning 
process was still unfinished. This caused problems as for instance the 
valuation of property to be sold to the waterboard was regarded as invalid by 
inhabitants and the agricultural association representing them, as long as the 
physical measures taken and the resulting living and working conditions were 
not yet fixed. In practice the waterboard faced a lousy negotiation position. 
Everybody knew it was under time pressure, expropriation was not feasible, 
the inhabitants / landowners communicated among each other displaying 
proudly their negotiation successes – and sometimes exaggerating them - 
effectively creating a ‘race to the top’ (for them) and confronting the 
waterboard with ever new demands. In addition – after some confusion about 
to what extent the agricultural association would also provide advice in 
individual cases (a branch of the national association does, but for pay) 
several external advisors were hired by the inhabitants that didn’t ease the 
negotiations, but boosted the results.  
 Even when the necessary permissions and land was obtained the 
activities were not an easy job. On the contrary. Even though ultimately a six 
months extension was obtained from the IRMA administrators, time pressure 
was killing, since only from October onwards the real work could start. This 
severely overstressed the supervising of building capacity, caused several 
irritations and lead to inefficiencies, like working large scale under very 
adverse weather conditions. At some point almost all parties involved had the 
inclination to stop this madness: the inhabitants, the building contractors, the 
supervising consultancy. However, the guillotine of the subsidy deadline made 
this impossible. As a matter of fact, though the budget was indeed exceeded 
as one would expect under these circumstances (half a million on a twelve 
million budget), this was not really an unusual degree.  
Mid 2002, less than four years after the flood crises, the retention area 
was realised6. Actually, now in hindsight the Retention Area North and South 
                                            
6 See http://projecten.nederlandleeftmetwater.nl/html/topic_6_100.htm, accessed September 
14, 2007. 
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Meene case is presented at many a forum as a successful example and is 
favourably compared with other projects that got really stuck somewhere in 
their trajectory.    
 
While in this third process no new couplings were made, apart from the lucky 
re-coupling of nature development to the project that we mentioned before, it 
should be noted that especially the linking of temporal scales that stemmed 
from the Interreg subsidy was a menacing challenge to the process.  
 
 
 
2.3  Actors and their motivation, cognitions and resources affecting 
the process 
 
Each process had some sub-processes of interaction between actors on 
specific issues. In this section an overview is giving of these actor-
constellations and the interaction that took place is explained from the actor 
characteristics: the motivation, cognitions and resources of the actors 
involved. For this purpose a rather informal application of Contextual 
Interaction Theory will be used – a bit more elaborately for the first process to 
show the principle of reasoning7. The central framework of this theory is 
visualised in figure 2.4. Policy processes are interaction processes between 
actors (people, parts of organizations). This includes policy implementation 
management. Many factors can have an influence on their activities and 
interactions but only because and in as far as they change relevant 
characteristics of the involved actors. These characteristics are: their motives 
(that drive their actions), their cognitions (information held to be true) and their 
resources (providing capacity and power). Figure 2.4 specifies how these 
characteristics are formed. For the smooth course of the process it helps 
when motivations and cognitions are sufficiently coherent: overlapping or 
complementary. Combined resources of proponents of a certain action need 
to be sufficient. When there are incoherent motivations it helps when the 
resource dependency and subjectively attributed powers are on the side of 
the proponents. 
 
                                            
7 More details on the reasoning and hypotheses are in Bressers 2004. 
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Figure 2.4, Dynamic interaction between the key actor-characteristics that 
drive social-interaction processes and in turn are reshaped by the process, as 
used in Contextual Interaction Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The flood crisis 
 
During the thrilling days of the flood crisis the inhabitants were negatively 
motivated for the inundation and evacuation that was suggested by the crisis 
manual. In fact they were as shocked as they were ignorant before that this 
could happen (cognitions). However there was nothing they could have done 
to prevent it when it would be decided (power). The municipality did have 
enough knowledge (cognitions) and resources (capacity and power) to do so. 
However there motivation was only positive to follow the manual in this when 
it would become unavoidable. Luckily this didn’t happen. If put through, forced 
cooperation would have been generally the case (Bressers 2004: 298). 
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P   M        I  A 
 
 
  W 
 
Figure 2.5, Actor constellation flood crisis (W waterboard, I inhabitants, P 
province, M municipality, A agricultural association,          central interaction) 
 
While in the first sub-process the ‘arena’ was the partially the site itself, the 
next story was confined in space and time to a crucial meeting in the 
backroom of a pub, organised by the agricultural association and the 
waterboard. Here the inhabitants were still shocked by threat of deliberate 
inundation (and its ‘secret’ policy basis in a manual) and urged measures to 
protect them and their property when flooded, also fearing for the value of 
their property now that the status of their area had been revealed. This point 
was well taken by the waterboard, which regarded protection as their core 
business (motivation). The concept of what to do was already there in the 
form of the policy innovation of a well prepared “retention area” (cognitions) 
and the only resource needed at this stage was decisiveness, which it 
displayed. While the motivations of the actors involved had different roots, 
they were pointing in the same direction. Not hampered by false cognitions 
nor lacking resources, consequently measures were announced to enable 
controlled inundation and the protection of people and buildings. So there was 
agreement at the time of the evening (though interpretation of what was said 
afterwards proofed a bit divergent). 
 
W            I 
 
 
 A 
 
Figure 2.6, Actor constellation follow-up meeting 
 
 
Planning and decision making 
 
The main stage (arena) for the next process was not so confined in time and 
place, the so-called sub-area committee Gramsbergen, making the “Area 
perspective WCL Vecht Regge”. This committee was already active but the 
preparation of the retention area was now made part of its task.  
 
 
 
 
 
As the sub-processes are rather integrated we will show the actor 
constellation in just one figure.  
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Figure 2.7, Actor constellation planning and decision-making process (new 
acronyms: A-N national agricultural association, C private consultants, IRMA 
Interreg programme, S construction supervising consultancy) 
 
 
Because it fitted better in this overview, in the actor constellation above also 
the interaction on agreeing measures with individual inhabitants is included, 
even though this ran trough both the planning and the implementation phase. 
While the main interaction on the design of the plan took place in the 
slipstream of the developments in the relationship with the inhabitants and 
later also the physical planning process, it is not separately analysed.   
 
Though not directly in the sub-area committee, in fact the inhabitants of the 
area were central stage most of the time. Only in the beginning their wishes 
were more or less ignored, a fact that later still had some impact on the 
degree of trust in the interactions with the waterboard. Their main motivation 
was initially mainly concentrating on the necessity of measures to protect 
themselves and their property, but when the fear of the flood had faded, the 
impact of the measures on living conditions and the compensation for 
damages became more important. When issues of land acquisition rose later 
in the process many were very eager to get the most out of it, even with the 
help of advisors. So in many issues their motivation went quickly from 
supporting to opposing the proposals of the waterboard, in the sense that they 
wanted more and more adaptations to their wishes. For them, and thus 
inevitably for the waterboard too, it became a negotiation game. Their 
cognitions of the situation and its “opportunities and threads” evolved, as well 
as their awareness of the resources at their disposal to influence the process. 
For instance, these were the rules of the area-oriented policy process in which 
framework the committee worked, urging that all action would be based on 
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voluntary agreement, strengthening the position of the inhabitants 
considerably.  
 
Supporting their positions, not only the individual consultants that several 
inhabitants hired later in the process, and the agricultural association that 
inventoried their wishes and brought them into the process – which was 
helpful – , but also the municipal council acted, and even went as far as 
demanding solutions that were satisfactory for the inhabitants in individual 
cases. The municipality also in general displayed a motivation that was more 
representing the wishes of the inhabitants of the area than the need to quickly 
realise the project to protect the towns that needed this retention area in case 
of threatening water levels. With this municipalities’ stance, the physical 
zoning plan process thus became a hard nut to crack for the waterboard. 
Especially since the powers in the zoning process are on the side of the 
municipality, with in addition ample options for consultation and objection for 
the inhabitants.  
 
The province took a deliberate back stage position, at crucial moments not 
supporting the waterboard. It kept a strict interpretation of rules on nature 
development making the inclusion of this objective in the plans virtually 
impossible8. It also initially denied the inclusion of the retention area in the 
indicative regional physical plan, since it preferred to follow and facilitate 
agreements of other actors rather than stimulate the municipalities’ zoning 
plan changes (displaying process objectives rather than contents objectives 
as a source of motivation).  
 
This left the waterboard in a rather isolated position, with its motivation to 
realise the retention area to protect people and property, but also to improve 
the robustness to more varying water levels of this part of their territory, and – 
if possible – to realise more nature development. Despite their “public private 
partnership” with a construction supervising consultancy, enabling them to 
issue some contracts before the IRMA deadline, they did not get proper 
advice on the necessity of a change in the municipal zoning plan9, making 
them work under false cognitions. As for their resources their formal powers 
were not applicable under the integrated area-oriented policy scheme and due 
to the Interreg subsidy there was a serious lack of the resource ‘time’. Money 
was available and a very important resources, but still only a restricted 
amount. There was also the “atomic bomb” fall back option to retreat fully and 
continue the old situation of a non prepared, but still designated area to be 
                                            
8 Would the province agree with this presentation of its position? Probably not. Their 
representatives would point to the fact that the retention area indeed was included in the 
provincial water plan, although not in the region plan. Of course, the province isn’t always a 
single actor, and in this case this shows. For the issue of getting through the zoning plan 
requirements, the reluctance of the province to fulfill a guiding role is nevertheless the most 
important position.  
9 The subject of retention zones being so new, the example of the only known previous site 
was taken. This was mistaken, since that site was uninhabited and already designated a 
nature area, a designation that indeed was considered not to be contradicting the retention 
purpose. The various advisors seem to have taken for granted that one of them must have 
considered the issue in detail and for the rest agreed with “the others”. But they were all 
wrong.  
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flooded when necessary to protect towns. An option that was worse for the 
inhabitants and in fact an “all lose” option. A further problem with this option 
was the “unconditional promise” made during the initial meeting with the 
inhabitants just after the crisis. Nevertheless this lingering option might very 
well have been a hidden and unacknowledged source of power of the 
waterboard, for instance to let the municipality realise after a while that, being 
a co-government, they should be more cooperative, or to let the agricultural 
association guide the inhabitants with remaining formal objections to withdraw 
these. 
 
All in all this resulted in a rather “turbulent” process with conflicts between the 
waterboard and the inhabitants and high time pressure. With power not clearly 
on its side the waterboard had no other option than to ensure a positive 
motivation with the inhabitants and municipality by making many concessions. 
While the first year often found the stalemates predicted by theory in such 
instances, this flexible line of the waterboard, gradually satisfying the 
demands by the inhabitants, resulted after 2000 in more constructive 
processes.  
 
 
Construction 
 
The construction process moved the “arena” back to the site where it all 
began. The actor constellation is much simpler at that stage, where the main 
interactions took place “in the field”.  
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Figure 2.8, Actor constellation construction process  
 
The high time pressure caused the process to speed up, but at the price of a 
lot of irritation and inefficiencies. This went even to the extent that the 
motivation of the actors involved all but faded away. The necessity now and 
then to prevent contractors to postpone their activities and even inhabitants to 
deny further entrance to their ground were signs of such tension. While at the 
end the realisation of the project did prove not to be beyond the capacity of 
the constructors – though at the expense of some extra money resources – 
they weren’t convinced of that during part of the process.     
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2.4 Boundary judgments and their impacts 
 
Boundary judgments are definitions of systems and problems that underpin 
conceptual models. For the purpose of our case study they can be defined as 
socially constructed definitions of the domain of relevance (in terms of 
relevant scales, problem and policy sectors and time and change aspects – 
see figure 2.9). Boundary judgments that differ among actors can cause 
incoherence and can even be a source of conflict. Boundary judgments that 
are too narrow for the adequate use of the innovation or so wide that 
complexity becomes unmanageable and can also stop all progress.  
 
In this section we will wonder what kind of boundary judgments of the actors 
involved can be observed and how they could have influenced the actor 
characteristics and the resulting processes. Some relevant boundary 
spanning was already mentioned as instances of “coupling”. Some of these 
couplings didn’t really have the character of “boundary disputes” over the 
relevant domain while there actually wasn’t disagreement about the coupling. 
But there are more boundary judgments that are recognisable and had an 
impact on the process. 
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Figure 2.9, Three dimensions that are relevant for boundary judgments 
 
 24
 
Spatial aspects of the domain 
A first issue is the degree of seeming self evidence with which the area of 
north and south Meene is regarded as the only one that is taken into 
consideration for the realisation of the retention area. While this may be true 
at the confined level of the municipality / -ies nearby or even the waterboard, it 
could have been different when the larger Vecht area, including the German 
part would have been taken into consideration.  
Neighbouring waterboards and German authorities are however 
reluctant to integrate their areas in a more encompassing review of flood 
lowering possibilities. The new policy programme GGOR – on integrated 
ground and surface water regimes – that came into effect after this case now 
demands such a broader spatial view, which also corresponds with the basin 
approach demanded by the European water framework directive. The 
problem remains however that the division of responsibilities over various 
authorities is very different on the other side of the border (and even between 
German Bundesländer), creating large uncertainties about what the status of 
agreements actually is and how “hard” they are when the safety of Dutch 
downstream towns requires action (implying the flooding of German areas). 
So the waterboard of Velt and Vecht too has problems to “enlarge the 
domain”, in the sense that it loses some grip on the actions that their 
responsibility might require.  
On the other hand many inhabitants have a quite understandable 
NIMBY attitude, by which the initial support for the realisation of the retention 
area waned. Their considerations were often confined to the direct 
surroundings of one’s own dwellings.  
 
Another spatial boundary judgment became obvious when the province did 
not see it as its task to play an active role in helping to fulfil the physical 
planning procedure requirements to enable the retention area and wanted to 
follow and accommodate rather than guide the local level authorities. Of 
course the waterboard disagreed with that emphasis on the very local scale 
by a government that could overview the regional scale. In a new policy 
agreement on national level that was concluded after the case the necessity 
of an active role of the provinces is reaffirmed. 
 
Sectoral aspects of the domain 
Different stakeholders emphasised their own sectoral interest, sometimes 
even while fully ignoring the others. The Waterboard concentrated on the 
basis of flood lowering capacity and nature development. The agricultural 
association assessed the project on its role for improving the agricultural 
structure. Also recreation and tourism are often part of integrated area-
oriented programmes. Many inhabitants felt they and their interests were 
excluded from initial planning under this policy scheme (could also be 
regarded a matter of coupling across scales). The inhabitants, and also the 
municipal city council in support of them, assessed the plans on the basis of 
value of property, consequences for living conditions and /or financial 
compensation.  
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The too narrow initial sectoral boundary judgments also lead to the late 
recognition of the relevance of the official municipal physical zoning plan and 
confusion over the legal basis for “planning damage” compensations.  
 
Temporal aspects of the domain 
A relevant background here is that the authorities (the WCL committee) 
initially postponed decision making on peak level protection by a retention 
area to 2002. Initially this was before the 1998 crisis thus beyond the 
immediate time horizon that aroused any actor to take action.  
 The time perspective also played a role while many inhabitants proved 
to have a short time perspective, losing their support for measures rather 
quickly after the “almost-disaster”. So during the course of time of the case 
period the motivation to cooperate was for a while wrongly assessed by the 
waterboard to be high amongst the inhabitants since they didn’t reckon with 
such swift erosion.  
By far the most compelling time issue was the European Interreg IRMA 
subsidy regulations that fixed very short temporal requirements – even though 
these were ultimately relaxed with half a year – conflicting with other 
procedures’ (and related actors’) time perspectives.  
 
The boundary judgment issues described above can be related to the five 
(excluding the almost de-coupling of nature issue) couplings that are listed in 
section 2.2.  
1. When the idea of the retention area was coupled to the safety concerns 
of the inhabitants directly after the flood crisis, the previous time 
perspective on this project as a subject ‘to be considered some time 
later’ gave way to a perspective of immediate action. This also 
increased the closure of the potential spatial area to be considered for 
retention, to the north and south Meene area.  
2. When the idea of the retention area was inserted in the ongoing 
planning regarding the “precious cultural landscape” coupling it with 
issues concerning landscape, nature, recreation and infrastructure for 
agriculture, even this broad collection of actors did explicitly regard the 
concerns of individual inhabitants “out of scope”, eventually leading to: 
3. Later efforts by the agricultural association to channel the wishes of the 
inhabitants lead to the issues of living conditions for inhabitants (“dikes 
too close around houses”), and financial compensation to enter the 
scene. But by then the “domain specification” of many inhabitants had 
already shrunk in terms of time, place and subject to their immediate 
individual circumstances (leaving the agricultural association wrestling 
between its collective action and member support roles). 
4. The large European subsidy provided much finance but also a huge 
time pressure conflicting with other time perspectives.  
5. The formal physical planning requirements were overlooked until they 
were forced upon the process. Clearly they were out of focus in the 
domain specifications of almost all actors involved.  
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2.5  Layers of contexts 
 
The inputs into the process and also the characteristics of the actors involved 
are not isolated. They have a context at several scales that all can have 
directly an impact on the characteristics of actors in the process. We discern 
next to the specific (policy) inputs, also the structural context, being the 
elements of the governance structure and – if relevant – the property and use 
rights regime. A still wider scale of contexts consists of e.g. the “facts” that 
can be included into the problem perceptions and the cultural backgrounds of 
the case, for instance the level of trust and consensus seeking and the way 
hierarchy is perceived and dealt with generally between the types of actors 
involved.  
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Figure 2.10, Layers of contextual factors 
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Specific inputs 
In this case there were several specific inputs into the process recognisable. 
These were for instance the policy document Outlook on river Vecht of 1997, 
the specification of the IRMA Interreg subsidy grant and previous decisions in 
the area-oriented committee postponing decision making on the retention 
area until after 2002, etceteras. We chose not to further deal with them here, 
since they are already mentioned in the descriptions and analyses of the 
processes. 
 
Structural context 
The structural context consists of the elements of public governance and the 
property and use rights, that are not specifically developed for the processes 
studied. Innovations often require new combinations of: scales, actors, 
perspectives, strategies and resources, than the ones that have developed in 
the past for more conventional purposes (Bressers and Kuks, 2003, 2004). 
This implies that the extent of relevant elements of governance has to be 
widened. The real boundary spanning challenge however is not the widening 
of the extent, but the protection or regaining of the coherence within and 
between these elements.  Is there any development towards more coherence 
– or restoring coherence – of these elements of governance during the 
process? Or is the opposite true and was fragmentation the result of the 
widened domain? And if so, to what degree was this situation a troublesome 
context for the process? Are there developments going on that might make 
these contexts more coherent in the future?  
 The levels and scales context shows the kind of spatial boundary 
issues that were mentioned in the section above. From the very local 
(dwellings and their surroundings) to the European level (be it in the form of a 
programme for Rhine and Meuse only) all levels of government were involved, 
maybe the national level least. It is hard to find any form of coherence here, 
while even the province did not really take up a guiding role. The river basin 
approach that is demanded by the European WFD is clearly not fully 
operational in an integrated fashion.    
There was not really a ready networks and actors context that was the 
obvious setting for the processes of this case. For the main process the actor 
setting of the integrated area-oriented policy scheme was chosen. However, 
this setting was not really attuned to the realities of the development of an 
inhabited retention area. The representation of the inhabitants was disputed 
since a number of issues were regarded as “out of scope” by the other actors, 
resulting in the leave of the only inhabitant in the committee and a small riot 
when the first plans were presented. The province was represented at rather 
low level, not really committing the province to the negotiated results. In as far 
as this network setting was insufficient, e.g. for the zoning planning and the 
nature development issues, the enlarged collection of actors was definitively 
in need of establishing productive relationships over these subjects. Later 
policy developments include the National Administrative agreement on Water 
management (Dutch acronym: NBW) (of representatives) of all ministries, 
provinces, waterboards and municipalities involved. In this agreement and its 
implementation some progress has been made with structural cooperation 
between these actors.  
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  The problem perspectives and goal ambitions context reflected this. 
While the collection of actors was not really coherent around this issue of 
planning a retention area, their perspectives were neither, each actor 
emphasising other stakes. While the policy scheme “WB21” (Water 
management for the 21 century) has specified problems and tasks, it did so 
with a perspective mainly on water quantity management. In the reality of 
water projects such as the one in our case study this extent of integration is 
however still not enough. Another issue is that in our ISBP work package 
description “boundary judgments” were coupled with the main discourses 
used: expert, market and people (Dryzek 1997). With the issue of water 
buffering and spatial planning, to which this case belongs, the confrontation 
was predicted to be between and expert discourse (waterboard) and a people 
discourse (physical planning). In reality some of this can be observed, but the 
typecasting is way too general to provide useful insights, for instance for 
developing productive “convergence mechanisms”. Differences in 
perspectives that were obvious were between a generic and an individualistic 
approach to the issues involved. We come back to this when discussing the 
wider political context.    
 The strategies and instruments context also shows a lack of 
coherence. The choice for the integrated area-oriented policy even implied 
that the use of some of the instruments available to promote the realisation of 
the retention area became hampered. For instance the way in which in 
physical planning the link with property and use rights is made – through the 
restricted and highly regulated use of expropriation “in the general interest” – 
became almost “not done”. All coherence rested upon the cooperation of the 
actors involved, and we have seen this was far from obvious. Later some 
instruments are developed that should strengthen the role of water 
management instruments viz. those of other sectors. The so-called “Water 
test” (Dutch: watertoets) gives the water managers the right to test new plans 
of other governments against the necessities of the water management in the 
region. However, this instrument is still more a pinch bar to force to be heard 
at all, than a device that stimulates all involved into coherent activities (Lulofs 
a/o. 2004). 
 Last but not least there is the context of the responsibilities and 
resources for implementation. Again a lack of coherence can be concluded 
here. The responsibility of realising retention areas that protect towns against 
flooding is taken up by the waterboards, but this – together with many more 
projects that stem from the WB21 and EU WFD – is beyond what is regarded 
as their normal or even acceptable financial capacity (waterboards do have an 
own taxation scheme in the Netherlands – tariff increases have however to be 
approved both by their own boards and by the province). Other national 
financial resources were only found as matching of the European Interreg 
subsidy. This however had complications of its own, since it was not attuned 
at all with the procedural requirements of the zoning planning legal rights of 
municipalities and citizens. Even though partly their own towns were to be 
protected by the retention area, the municipality for a while did not seem to 
make itself co-responsible for the realisation of the project.  
 
All in all we conclude that there was no ready structural context for the 
realisation of this innovation. It had to be extended, even beyond the as such 
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also integrative area-oriented policy scheme. This resulted in a clear lack of 
coherence, which often hampered the process. While later policy 
developments can be read as attempts to organise some coherence of 
governance for this policy (“space for water”), our estimate is that these are 
still insufficient to create a new governance structure with both enough extent 
and coherence. 
 
Wider contexts 
The problem context is not only given by the process of climate change 
causing more irregular river levels and an increased risk of flooding. Part of 
the problem context is also the Dutch population pressure and development. 
In the 1930s the area involved regularly flooded and everyone was prepared 
for that.  
This is related to the economical context. Not only the natural situation 
changed. Also the manmade environment changed dramatically. While the 
value of the property has soared and measures of individual preparedness 
gave way to “more efficient” farming, the vulnerability of the area in economic 
terms has increased simultaneously.  
 The technological context doesn’t seem to have had a very important 
impact here. Though the concept of an inhabited and well prepared retention 
area can be regarded an innovation, the technology for creating one is not 
really advanced, at least not to the extent that such project would have been 
unfeasible in the recent past.  
 A political context that is still water management oriented is provided 
by the general outlook of “space for water”. In this general policy outlook 
adaptation to the natural water system and taking its functions for flora, fauna, 
and landscape serious, rather than intervening in the water system for the 
purpose of optimising narrow economic functions is a major break with the 
past. Kuks (2004) labels this the sixth phase of Dutch water management 
since 1814. Actually many concrete water projects can be labelled as 
“undoing the past” (Huitema and Kuks 2004: 76) since in several cases the 
situation that existed in the past is restored.  
An even more general aspect of the political context is the shift in the 
sources of legitimacy of the policy process. Scharpf (e.g.1997: 153-155) 
discerns input-oriented and output-oriented legitimacy. In the past decennia 
there is a clear tendency that legitimacy with the people and with stakeholders 
alike is less firmly rooted in the (positive) assessment of the way decisions are 
taken and more and more dependent on the (positive) assessment of the 
resulting outcomes. This places more pressure on every policy process and 
certainly a complex one like the one that we have studied here. It is also a 
strong incentive for more network oriented ways of policy making in which 
stakeholders are involved. The problem for this as a device to construct extra 
legitimacy is however that also this stakeholder orientation has became part 
of “normal expectations”.  
This brings us to the issue of the cultural context. The cultural context 
is of special interest to ISBP. Here we take the concept of culture in a rather 
simple and straightforward way, inspired by “cultural theory” (Thompson a/o. 
1990, Schwarz and Thompson 1990). On the one hand a culture can be 
defined by the degree of trust and consensus-seeking. On the other hand by 
the way in which is dealt with matters of hierarchy and the strictness of formal 
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rules. Generally and comparatively the Netherlands is often regarded as a 
country with a relative high level of trust and consensus-seeking and a rather 
relaxed way of dealing with hierarchy and rules. Here some differences with 
the more legalistic German culture can be recognised, that indeed surface 
when water management needs to be coordinated across the border (Lulofs 
and Coenen 2007). Of course the general characterisation of the Netherlands 
does not preclude differences between sectors or actors, that can surface 
during processes as the one studied here. One of the issues occurred when 
the province was regarded as a spoilsport when it held firmly to a strict 
interpretation of the standards for “new” nature, instead of “working this out” 
with the waterboard. Another was when the network-cooperation oriented 
committee crushed into the more legalistic culture of the Dutch zoning plan 
requirements.  
 
As this section shows, the contexts of the processes were not always helpful 
for dealing with a lot of issues requiring “boundary spanning” activities. These 
activities in turn require a central actor like the waterboard to be open to the 
complexity of the situation and able to deal with this complexity.  
 
 
 
2.6  Receptivity and its impacts 
 
Receptivity is the ability of an actor to associate and exploit new knowledge 
around existing knowledge, activities and objectives (Jeffrey and Seaton 
2003/4). While it is connected to the cognitive aspect of human behaviour in 
this formulation one can imagine that “adaptive implementation” also and 
likewise requires that motivations remain flexible enough to incorporate new 
ones that might serve the interests or ideals of actors and to be able to 
creatively combine resources in new ways to support intended actions 
(compare figure 2.4). The role of receptivity in the process as a whole can in 
principle also refer to the receptivity of the set of actors as a network. Here we 
will however concentrate on one crucial actor, the waterboard.  
 
Lulofs (2003) assessed that the waterboard showed “flexibility, creativeness 
and perseverance” in this process. In general for assessing the receptivity of 
the waterboard the distinction can be made between preview, overview and 
responsiveness (each next one has been done better). This corresponds with 
the observation that in the first year there were often stalemates. After 2000 
the process continued more constructive. Was this partially an impact of 
change in receptivity?  
 
A lack of preview was observed on the degree of support of the population 
(that had been waning after the initial crisis), the profit maximizing orientation 
of the landowners, and the unavoidable zoning planning procedures. Lulofs 
(2003) speaks of a lack of “institutionalised analytical capacity”.  
 
During the process the waterboard merged with another one into the new 
waterboard of Velt and Vecht.  This merge enabled the waterboard to 
introduce fresh people into difficult negotiations. The same merge gave the 
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organisation a large number of yet unsettled internal roles and made the 
situation “fluid”. As stipulated in the ISBP proposal this had both positive and 
negative sides. On the one side indeed new people with open minds of 
themselves and not affected by the confrontations in the first year, could enter 
the scene. But also the internally different opinions on the seriousness of the 
zoning plan difficulties and consequently the tardy response of the waterboard 
in general could have been aggravated by this circumstance. As a matter of 
fact, also another main actor experienced a merge. But the merge of the 
municipality of Gramsbergen into the larger municipality of Hardenberg had 
hardly any effect since the same civil servant kept this portfolio. It even 
decreased the chance that the new council would take up old positions of the 
Gramsbergen council on defending individual inhabitant’s interests.  
 
Another issue here is the framework contract between the waterboard and 
Arcadis, that was concluded to ensure that an order for part of the work could 
be given early on, responding to the pressure of the European deadline. This 
contract left vagaries regarding roles, tasks and responsibilities, and was not 
in all respects complete. It added to the ‘fluidity’ of the organisation, and 
certainly not only in a productive way.  
 
An interesting observation is that the process was not only influenced by the 
characteristics of this central actor, but that process experiences have also 
been influencing the characteristics of actors (compare figure 2.4). The 
process produced:  
- more information on the realisation of inhabitant retention areas, as this 
was a real path breaking experience; 
- more experience with the various roles of actors in area-oriented policy 
scheme implementation of retention areas. 
Such lessons can be helpful for future projects. In the next section we will 
concentrate on the lessons we can extract from the perspectives of this study. 
 
 
 
2.7  Managing complexity by boundary spanning  
 
Managing complexity requires boundary spanning across sectors, scales and 
time perspectives. This coupling can specifically regard the boundary 
judgements – as a precondition for fruitful cooperation – which is the core of 
interest of the ISBP project, but also the wider and practical boundary 
spanning that is required to make the project run. Often the division between 
the two is not very clear, while creating fruitful cooperation across boundaries 
can also be one of the best methods to gradually integrate the boundary 
judgments of the actors involved. The relationship between (restricted or 
divergent) boundary judgments of the actors involved affecting the 
cooperation in the process, thus can be also reversed in as far as reasonably 
successful interaction and cooperation can help boundary judgments to “open 
up”.  
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Grabbing opportunities 
While the idea of a retention area in the case study district was not new and 
even had made it to some white papers, this was not really known to the 
inhabitants. And even if some would have read the texts there was so much 
indistinctness about what and when that it would have probably not be 
regarded as an issue with much saliency. During the flood crisis this changed. 
In the immediate aftermath the agricultural association organised a meeting 
with the inhabitants and the waterboard. This can be regarded as a new arena 
to enable convergence, although a onetime one. While undoubtedly the minds 
of the inhabitants opened up to include “inundation preparedness” in their 
domain, this was probably more a “window of opportunity” (Kingdon 1995, 
Zahariadis 1999) created by the own experience of the flood crisis itself than a 
product of the evening. Apart from cognitions also their motivation was 
affected at that time – but that was only to last to some degree. The firm 
stance of the waterboard chairman supporting the measures even to the 
degree of making an unconditional promise was a motivational response to 
the observed flood crisis too. Nevertheless this can be viewed as an 
exemplary occasion of the coupling of the three Kingdon streams (problem 
perception, existing ideas on measures and political support), placing the 
realisation of the “retention area” high on the agenda.  
 
The scope of integration 
When the idea of the retention area was inserted in the ongoing planning 
regarding the “precious cultural landscape” it was not only accepted by the 
other actors in the committee, but also coupled with issues concerning 
landscape, nature, recreation and infrastructure for agriculture. This can be 
regarded as coupling through the selection of an appropriate arena. However, 
this broad collection of actors did explicitly regard the concerns of individual 
inhabitants “out of scope”. The resulting first version of the plan came as a 
shock to many inhabitants that saw their living conditions threatened. This fell 
back on the waterboard more than upon other actors involved in the 
committee, while it had taken a central role in this network, getting its way with 
the actors present, but not with the excluded actors. The inhabitants regarded 
the strategy of the waterboard in this first year (1999) as one of “dictate”, 
certainly not as dialogue. Such re-framing of the process and its main actor 
created a negative filter of mistrust that was extremely hard to falsify later on 
for the waterboard. The negative effect of this hampered succeeding phases.   
 
Channelling demands 
The agricultural association made an inventory of demands from inhabitants / 
farmers. This is an example that a “report” could change the cognitions of the 
actors involved in the committee. It enabled a more structured dealing with 
these issues. Maybe it was for that reason that the elaboration could be 
postponed to the implementation phase (there following “normal procedures”). 
The coupling across subjects and scales with the individual inhabitants in that 
phase was to a large extent done by and could be labelled as the “positive 
use of external pressure with resources”. This proved a strong and sometimes 
only practicable “convergence mechanism” in practice: buy them out and pay 
the ransom. One could say that all others serve to prevent this to be the only 
option left. Of course it is far from the sophisticated idea of enlarging and 
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converging the domain specifications of the actors involved in order to enable 
them to cooperate. In fact, after the initial flood crisis there had been actually 
a decline of such coherence, general interest issues giving way to individual 
interests with the inhabitants. Private consultants entered the scene as new 
actors, but without a “boundary spanning” attitude. Rather than with process 
objectives, they entered even with firm contents objectives, magnifying those 
of their clients. An example of a late conversion to another motivation, was 
when selling land for nature proved to be an attractive option for one of the 
inhabitants after all, making nature development feasible just before closing 
time. 
 
Costly resources 
Spanning the boundaries between the very different timescales of the 
important Interreg subsidy scheme, and that of the tasks of getting 
agreements with individual inhabitants, legal permissions (see under) and 
building the works was very difficult. Were there “convergence mechanisms” 
used? Convincing the subsidy managers that they should give half a year 
leeway, was certainly one. Another was the introduction of new actors. Not 
one building contractor, but three, and also a coordinating consultancy to 
guard the day to day building process. Nevertheless also these actors had to 
be motivated over and over again to keep trying to bridge the temporal scales.  
 
Getting the legal permission 
The zoning plan was a hard nut to crack, especially since it was largely 
unforeseen that it was a serious issue to deal with. The representative of the 
municipality had to force the boundary judgments of the other actors, 
especially the waterboard, open in the hard way, by a straightforward threat to 
actually block the further process. Here we saw a potential “boundary 
spanning actor” that did not want to play this part, the province that wanted to 
facilitate agreements among the other actors, not to organise them. But there 
was also an actor that had a double role. On the one hand the agricultural 
association acted as an interest group that promoted the interests of the 
inhabitants (all farmers) and stimulated them to make good use of their legal 
rights to object and appeal. This could have been very disruptive and could 
have easily caused the failure of the whole process in light of the rather 
individualistic attitude that by then many inhabitants held. However, when a 
majority of the inhabitants had reached an agreement with the waterboard, it 
became a threat to these and the association alike that a very small number 
of more stubborn farmers would block any progress and even could provide 
an excuse for the waterboard to call the whole project off. At this stage most 
likely the association became a broker and stimulated the last remaining 
appeals to be withdrawn.  
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3.  Building a new river: The Breakthrough 
 
 
 
 
3.1  The issue 
 
On 1 July 2004 the construction of a new stream, 13 km in length in the Dutch 
Province of Overijssel commenced. This was a long-cherished dream of the 
water board of Regge & Dinkel: the stream would help prevent flooding and 
droughts and would contribute to maintaining and even improving water 
quality in the system of streams in the countryside, which the new stream 
would separate from the urban system.  
The stream crosses a motorway, the Twente Canal, a railway and gas 
pipelines, and transits planning areas under the control of three local 
authorities: Almelo, Wierden and Tubbergen. The plans of the three 
authorities initially considered the area crossed by the Breakthrough as 
agricultural land and nature reserve; at that time it was mainly in private 
hands. The area also contained a railway line, property of ProRail (the railway 
infrastructure company), a few country roads, and two main roads, the A35 
and the N74, managed by the Ministry of Public Works (Rijkswaterstaat).  
The land was originally agricultural or was in private hands, but project 
developers were active. Constructing the stream thus necessitated changes 
to the Provincial and Local Authority plans, the operational plans of the 
railway management company and the natural gas authority (Gas Unie), the 
project developers’ plans, and those of the land’s owners. Moreover, the 
Waterboard would neither be able nor willing to bear the € 40 million cost of 
the project. Obviously, therefore, a lot of boundary spanning was involved 
before the waterboard of Regge & Dinkel could build the Breakthrough, which 
is why the project is such an excellent case study for the present research. 
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Figure 3.1, Area of the Waterboard of Regge and Dinkel (= Twente region); 
case study area marked with an oval (source: www.wrd.nl) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2, Location of the Breakthrough (source: Arcadis, 1999) 
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As early as the 1980s the province of Overijssel and the water board of 
Regge & Dinkel both agreed that something should be done about the 
situation in which relatively clean water from a system of streams in the 
countryside was mixed with relatively polluted water in the urban system in 
the densely populated Twente region10. They went public with their ideas in 
1992, in a strategic document in which the waterboard also announced a 
number of projects that would allow the concept to be implemented. The idea 
of separating country from urban water by constructing a new stream could be 
recognized in this document, but was not set out as a concrete project.  In 
fact, the waterboard had not yet investigated whether the construction of a 
new stream would be feasible. In 1993 the waterboard commissioned a 
number of students at Wageningen University to conduct a multidisciplinary, 
exploratory study of the construction of a stream, 13 km long and 25 m wide, 
in an area to the south of the city of Almelo, which the Province of Overijssel 
had allocated as an ecological highway. At the time, a national land utilisation 
project was also underway, aimed at the more efficient reallocation of land 
and countering droughts. Since these plans could readily be united with the 
construction of a new stream, and because both the ecological and 
hydrological conditions appeared favourable, the students concluded that the 
construction of the stream was not only technically feasible; it was also a 
viable policy option. The outcome of their study led to further research into 
options whereby the idea of digging a new stream could be worked out in 
practice. 
 
Section 3.2 tells the story of the Breakthrough – the case description – after 
which the case is analysed according to the method set out in Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
3.2  Processes and coupling 
 
 
Sharing ideas: initial plan development 
By 1997 the Waterboard was sufficiently well-aware of the technical feasibility 
and went public with a plan to construct a new stream in a document entitled 
Reggevisie. This document named the conservation of relatively clean country 
water quality and countering drought as the most important reasons for 
digging the Breakthrough. 
 Simultaneously with this publication, the waterboard initiated 
government links by inviting leading government figures – upon whom the 
waterboard deemed itself dependent – to come together in a governmental 
steering committee for joint consideration of the plan for the Breakthrough. 
The invitation was accepted by aldermen from the local authorities of 
Tubbergen, Wierden, Almelo and Borne, and representatives of the province 
of Overijssel and the local Agricultural and Market Gardeners’ Organisation 
(GLTO, hereafter “agricultural association”). In the meetings that followed it 
                                            
10 The Twente region is 1350 square kilometers and has 600.000 inhabitants, more than half 
of them concentrated in three almost adjacent cities, leaving also room for quiet rural areas.  
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turned out that they all agreed that the Breakthrough was both necessary and 
useful. Thanks to the support for the abstract idea of separating country from 
urban water by means of a waterway, the steering committee was almost 
immediately able to go on to consider how the Waterboard could implement 
its plan. Before this ‘how?’ question got onto the agenda, though, the province 
of Overijssel emphasised that any actions would be assessed within the 
overall context of the Overijssel Nature and Countryside Policy Plan (in Dutch: 
Beleidsplan Natuur en Landschap Overijssel), dating from 1992. This made it 
clear that the province’s cooperation was conditional on the Breakthrough 
functioning as an ecological highway. The nature and landscape plan in fact 
indicated that the area where the Breakthrough was planned was a potential 
site for the location of the National Ecological Network. This condition had 
consequences for the design: if the Breakthrough was to function as an 
ecological highway, the Waterboard would have to add 25 metres of 
greensward to both banks in country areas. As much as 75 metres extra 
would have to be reserved on both banks in areas where the stream bordered 
urban functions and infrastructure. 
 
This involved a major expansion of the land area needed, well beyond the 25 
metre wide stream that the waterboard had been discussing up to then. It was 
obvious to the members of the steering committee that only so could the 
Breakthrough be useful for both purposes, both of which they supported. 
Subsequent negotiations on the route to be adopted (there were still four 
options under consideration) were thus all based on the wider, dual-function 
version. 
 
The participants also had other ideas about the way the space in the area 
planned for the Breakthrough should be used, and they also entered into the 
discussions. For example, the local authorities of the three major cities 
Almelo, Enschede and Hengelo were toying with the idea of locating a 
regional business park in the Almelo sector of the planned Breakthrough area. 
The alderman from Wierden proposed ideas from the Land Reallocation 
Committee (which he chaired), involving a project for Enter village, intended to 
lead to improved land allocation and fewer drought problems for agriculture in 
the area. The province proposed that the Breakthrough should be included in 
the land reallocation project, which would mean that, when the time came, the 
province could use (legal) instruments and funding from the reallocation 
project for the construction of the Breakthrough. Under the Land Reallocation 
Act in force at the time, funding from this source could only be used for strictly 
formulated land reallocation objectives, and not for such matters as the 
implementation of the National Ecological Network or a new waterway. The 
province was aware, though, that the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and 
Fishery (Landbouw Natuur en Visserij: LNV) was considering amendments to 
its land reallocation policy, which, it was presumed, would relax restrictions on 
the use of funding from this source, in the sense that it would then be 
available for creating the National Ecological Network. In order to be able to 
profit from this funding from the land reallocation policy, the Land Reallocation 
Committee, which the Wierden alderman chaired, could not present the land 
reallocation project to the provincial government before the national 
government had passed its amendment to the Land Reallocation Act. This 
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implied that the land reallocation project would be delayed, since it had been 
in preparation for years, it was now nearly complete, and would be ready for 
implementation in a far shorter time-frame than central government needed 
for its amendments. Nevertheless, the Governmental Steering Committee 
speedily agreed to link the Breakthrough to the land reallocation project. 
 
In this way the Steering Committee gathered together ideas about the area’s 
development, which had been developed disparately prior to that time. These 
exchanges also afforded an insight into the background to the criteria that 
each participant proposed for assessing the four alternative routes. These 
were worked out by an external consultancy, leading in 1999 to the report 
‘Country Water through the Urban Belt’ (Landelijk water door de Stedenband). 
The multicriteria analyses performed for this report showed a preference for a 
route that followed existing waterways as far as possible. Only the agricultural 
association was against this, since it objected to the extra crossing of the 
agricultural area that this plan involved. 
 
In this first phase already a number of couplings took place with extra 
objectives. While the initial goal was a) to separate relatively clean rural water 
from more polluted urban water, b) preventing droughts was quickly added by 
the water board itself. These were both still water policy goals (quality and 
quantity respectively), but the province added a major goal from another 
policy field: nature protection, demanding that c) the project area would serve 
as an ecological highway, with great consequences for the contents of the 
project, especially its spatial characteristics. From – predominantly - 
agricultural policy d) the contribution of the project to land reallocation, 
improving among others the agricultural infrastructure was put forward, also 
shifting the temporal aspects of the project. Thus the project evolved very 
quickly into a complex multi-purpose enterprise. At the background another 
issue was already visible, though as yet only as a possible competitor for 
space: the plan for a regional business park.  
 
Fear for nature 
Complaints were also voiced in Enter village, in the Wierden local authority 
area, when the province of Overijssel, the Waterboard and the Wierden 
alderman pressed for a link with the land reallocation project under 
development there. They had no problem with a link between the waterway 
and the land reallocation project as such, but the link with the ecological 
highway was a cause for concern, since the rules for a nature reserve might 
then become applicable, which might hamper their agricultural practices11. 
The forceful suggestion that the project should be presented only after the 
Land Reallocation Act had been amended also encountered great resistance, 
since this would involve yet another delay. Be that as it may, the Land 
Reallocation Committee itself was convinced that the Breakthrough would be 
a valuable addition to the land reallocation project. True, it would take longer, 
but the water budget would improve the situation for the landowners, while a 
beautiful nature reserve would also be created. This was why the committee 
                                            
11 The core phrase expressing their fear was: “If a rare butterfly picks this ecological area to 
settle down, we’ll get all the restrictions of the EU and Dutch habitat policies on our back!” 
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members also took a great deal of trouble to convince their constituencies. 
Besides this, the chairman also had to take pains to convince his own 
constituency, the Wierden local council, of which he was an alderman. He had 
to fight his corner a number of times, as several farmers expressed their 
displeasure directly to a number of individual councillors who then, of course, 
started putting critical questions to the alderman.  
 
As the amendment of the Land Reallocation Act neared its completion, the 
Land Reallocation Committee succeeded in recruiting support for the Steering 
Committee’s preferred route. Finally, the Land Reallocation Committee was 
able to offer its land reallocation plan to the province of Overijssel, including 
the preferred route for the Breakthrough. 
 
In this phase not a new project goal was added or removed, but in another 
way a necessary coupling was prepared: with the local physical planning of 
the municipality of Wierden. While an important part of the course of the 
stream was decided upon, the story on the physical planning of the 
municipality of Wierden does not end here. It will be resumed later, but first 
we’ll explain a more or less simultaneous developing part of the story. 
 
‘Hot land’ 
The land reallocation plan afforded clarity about the location, width, detailed 
planning and funding of the first part of the route in Wierden. There was, 
however, maximum uncertainty about the next part of the route that might 
border the Regional Business Park, about which the local authorities of 
Almelo, Enschede and Hengelo were in consultation. The only certainty the 
Province could offer was that, if the business park were to be sited to the 
south of Almelo and if the Breakthrough were to border the business park, 
then the stream would have to be widened yet further there. To get some 
clarity about whether the business park would in fact be located there, the 
province initiated an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). This involved 
obligatory publication of the initiating memorandum, which meant that the 
landowners in the province’s and the local authority’s preferred area for the 
business park realised they were sitting on ‘hot’ land. Land prices in the area 
thus rose considerably, including the land needed for the Breakthrough. 
Speculation about the business park thus resulted in greater estimated costs 
for the Breakthrough. Those landowners who might have to vacate their 
property or who would be imposed a view over a business park were 
benefited by the clear information on the business park’s location. The land 
area needed, including that needed for the Breakthrough, would increase if 
the business park were to lie adjacent to the Breakthrough, so land acquisition 
could not start soon enough. 
 
It could have taken years to pass through all the stages needed for an 
Environmental Impact Statement, but there was urgent need for a speedy 
resolution of the matter. The provincial government, which was involved in 
and benefited from both projects, therefore considered ways to accelerate the 
process. In 2000 the province divided the Environmental Impact Statement 
procedure into two. This meant that an advisory committee would first work on 
a location impact statement. As soon as this process generated one likely 
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location, this would be opened to public consultation, leading to greater clarity. 
Only then would the Environmental Impact Statement be prepared for the 
actual detailed planning of the site. 
 
Again, this story does not end here and will be resumed later. However, 
already in this phase the position of the province made clear that the project 
could be coupled to an additional function, namely e) creating a buffer zone 
for the business park separating it from residential and other zoning. Herewith 
in fact the spatial scale of the domain of the project was increased.   
 
Detailing and presenting the plan 
While the preparations and actual drafting of the Environmental Impact 
Statement were in progress, another investigation of the Breakthrough 
started.  After the route had been chosen, the next logical step was to look at 
possible detailed planning. To that end, in late 1999 the Governmental 
Steering Committee once again formulated a number of objectives that the 
planned stream would have to fulfil. The objectives derived from a number of 
disciplines: water, ecology, agriculture, landscape, leisure, and management. 
The detailed plan resulting from this investigation was presented to the public 
in November 2000 in three very crowded information evenings. There were 
four differences between the plans as presented and the first sketch of the 
Breakthrough, presented by the waterboard just after publication of 
Reggevisie in 1998. First of all, the communication method was different. The 
first public announcement was literally a presentation and was actually very 
one-sided. In its 2000 presentation the waterboard explicitly left room for 
questions both during and after the presentation. The attendees were glad to 
make full use of the opportunity and some of the proposals were actually used 
by the waterboard in its detailed plans for the Breakthrough. For example, 
they scrapped the water retention areas drawn on the plans. Sadly, not all the 
questions put by the audience received a response. The waterboard was not 
in a position, for instance, to answer the many questions related to the 
possible Business Park. A second difference between the first presentation 
and the three later ones in 2000 was that in 2000 the Breakthrough was 
presented explicitly as a waterway that would also function as an ecological 
highway. This was related to the third difference: the size of the Breakthrough. 
The stream was originally presented as being 25 metres wide, but had now 
been expanded to 75 metres, while it could even be as wide as 175 metres 
along the tentative boundary with the Business Park. A fourth difference was 
that the waterboard presented the Breakthrough as a way to prevent flooding.  
The emphasis was no longer on improving water quality. The waterboard 
expected some marketing advantage from this changed accent since in 1998 
it was found that the water system was inadequate to cope with heavy rainfall, 
which had led to serious problems. This was still readily recalled by most 
residents, who would therefore more easily understand and subscribe to the 
need for the Breakthrough. 
 
Moreover, central government had launched a national campaign to persuade 
people that water needed more space as a result of climate change and 
similar issues, which could also help recruit support for the Breakthrough. This 
national campaign started in response to the new motto introduced by the 
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Committee for Water Management in the 21st Century in its advisory note, 
which suggested that a policy of integrated water management should be 
replaced or supplemented by the concept of adaptive water management, 
meaning that water should be given more space, to include its dynamic 
aspects.  
 
In this part of the process – on the more detailed planning and presentation of 
the project – some new objectives were added to the existing ones. In the 
assignment to develop the plan also f) landscape and recreation were 
mentioned. Next to that in the domain of water purposes g) flood prevention 
was now emphasized. Even though the means of creating retention areas 
was quickly removed from the plan, the river with its wide natural banks would 
create a lot of storage and discharge capacity. Interestingly, the water quality 
issue of separating rural and urban waters was now less emphasised, while of 
course it was still included and – given the EU Water Framework directive – 
probably even more important than ever.    
 
Gold rush 
The attention to new types of water management was also manifest at the 
European level, and the Breakthrough’s project leader discovered to his 
delight that this attention also formed part of the European subsidy 
programme Interreg 3b, which is intended to encourage projects that would 
lead to more space for water. The project leader was correct in his appraisal 
that the Breakthrough would be eligible for a grant under this programme. The 
most important requirement for participating in the programme was that the 
Waterboard should have at least two foreign partners. The project leader 
rapidly found Dutch partners: the colleague waterboards of Groot Salland and 
Velt & Vecht, and the National Countryside Service. In search of foreign 
partners he visited an exhibition in Rotterdam in 2001, where he was 
successful. With them he submitted a funding request, which was granted, 
and so there came a decisive moment. Accepting this grant meant that the 
ground would actually have to be broken, and very soon, to start construction 
of the Breakthrough: the funds would only be paid out after concrete results 
had been achieved within a set period of time. This meant that the funding 
process had actually overtaken the legal and practical processes that the 
waterboard was pursuing to make the Breakthrough a reality. The 
practicalities involved a public tendering process that could in fact only get 
under way after the legal procedures had been complied with to make the 
Breakthrough possible. The legal aspects meant at least that the Waterboard 
had to acquire title to the land needed for the Breakthrough, while the local 
authorities and the provincial government would have to amend their 
planning, which involved long, drawn out procedures. If the residents were to 
avail themselves of all avenues of appeal open to them, then the period within 
which concrete results could be achieved in order to gain the grant funding 
might be very short indeed. 
 
In brief: accepting the grant would bring with it exciting times, which in the 
worst case would lead to immense costs, but to a vast financial injection if all 
turned out well. Another advantage could be that the construction of the first 
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part of the route might call forth such enthusiasm that other funding options 
would suddenly open up. 
 
While the waterboard was wrestling on the horns of this dilemma, the 
Governmental Steering Committee was successful in reaching a cost 
allocation. The Steering Committee formalised these agreements in the form 
of a Declaration of Intent in December 2001, in which they also formally 
affirmed their support for the Breakthrough. Partly thanks to this government 
support, now set down in black and white in the Declaration of Intent, and 
because the grant appeared to be a real possibility, there was a general 
increase of confidence in the Breakthrough’s feasibility. The waterboard 
therefore resolved to take the risk associated with accepting the grant. 
 
The grant demanded a great amount of administration and also meant that 
the project would have to get underway very soon, so the Breakthrough 
project leader was rechristened ‘grant coordinator’. The actual development of 
the Breakthrough was put in the hands of a new project leader, who until then 
had had only been peripherally involved with research into the technical and 
substantive aspects. The waterboard also asked someone from the National 
Countryside Service (Dienst Landelijk Gebied: DLG) to steer the process and 
to act as a neutral, independent party. By coincidence, one member of the 
Countryside Service staff had acted as tutor to the students who had 
published the first report on the Breakthrough in 1994. This person thus 
seemed eminently suitable and rapidly joined as process manager. The new 
project leader, the process manager and a person from the province of 
Overijssel now made up the steering committee. Even though the 
Breakthrough’s go-ahead could not yet be guaranteed, they nevertheless 
started to acquire the land in 2002. As agreed with the provincial government, 
they were able to access the funds available for land reallocation and 
reconstruction. There was, however, a maximum price per hectare for the 
land that the Countryside Service could buy with this money. 
 
Speculation about the Business Park had led some land prices to climb above 
this maximum. In late June 2002 the Waterboard’s Management Board 
extended a credit of € 8,200,000 so that this land could be acquired. 
Additional funds were secured from the national program to increase flood 
prevention and storage capacity in the perspective of climate change (the 
National Intergovernmental Covenant on Water), reemphasizing flood control 
as one of the purposes of the project.  
 
This part of the process did not lead to extra purposes for the project. Having 
typical EU demands like recreational opportunities included in the no less than 
seven purposes we mentioned already, this was also hardly conceivable.  
 
Bypassing the physical plan for the first trajectory 
We left the scene at Wierden at the moment that the trajectory was proposed. 
But that was not the end of this story. Between 2002 and 2005 a number of 
enquiries had been held by both internal and external experts to detail the 
main outlines of the plan and test their feasibility, both technical and 
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substantive, and to answer the questions raised by interested parties and 
ultimately to gain their support. 
 
While various inquiries were in progress into the substantive issues 
surrounding the Breakthrough, an external consultancy was asked to prepare 
a draft zoning plan for the area surrounding the stream. The waterboard’s 
intention here was to save time and expense for the four local authorities, 
which would have to amend their zoning plans to make the Breakthrough 
legally feasible, and to maintain the pace of the process, which the 
waterboard itself needed as there was no time available to attend to all the 
zoning law procedures before starting work on the first part of the 
Breakthrough’s route: the grant was time-limited. The waterboard therefore 
asked the Wierden local authority, in whose area they wanted to start 
excavating, to use such legal options as were available to depart from the 
current zoning plan. Thanks to the alderman’s involvement and enthusiasm, 
the council agreed to this proposal in September 2003. The waterboard’s draft 
resolution, the draft zoning plan, and the petition of 25 September to 24 
October 2003 to depart from the then current zoning plan in Wierden were 
opened to public inspection that same month. In the meantime, the 
waterboard organised an information evening, attended by 150 interested 
parties. Their reactions were set down in a memorandum which, with 
responses, was later distributed to the attendees. It was clear from the 
memorandum that the waterboard was genuinely open to reactions: some of 
them had actually resulted in changes to the plans. 
 
The reactions had other consequences, too. Many of them revealed a real 
need to be involved in the process, which led to an intensification of the 
communication. The waterboard had a logo designed for the Breakthrough, to 
be printed on all the illustrated newsletters. They also planned notice boards, 
they launched a website, they visited the most directly involved landowners in 
their homes, and they held information evenings and published articles in the 
daily press and magazines. There was a risk that journalists would perceive 
minor irregularities in the process as major blunders, so the communication 
strategy also meant that every journalist would be referred to the same 
spokesperson, they would keep their distance if it didn’t work out, and the 
press would be invited in case of successes. 
 
Support for the Breakthrough increased steadily in the local council of 
Wierden where the first part of the Breakthrough was planned, especially 
when the waterboard promised that all instances of possible planning blight 
would be compensated at the waterboard’s cost. When the time came for the 
council to pass the final resolution, however, the alderman who had always 
been closely involved with the Breakthrough actually had to confess that this 
agreement was not permitted by law. He was able to convince the council that 
central government was preparing to scrap the right to compensation for 
planning blight, so no risk was involved. This was accepted by the council and 
it was thanks to the subsequent resolution that the first part of the route could 
start. When, on 19 February 2004, the time came for the waterboard’s general 
council to decide on detailed planning and changes to water management, the 
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most serious legal hurdles had in fact been crossed, and the spade went into 
the ground for the first part of the route in July 2004. 
 
 
Nature against nature? 
While the legal impediments to the first part of the route were past history, 
many hurdles still had to be crossed for the parts of the route passing through 
the other local authorities. It was especially the residents in the central part of 
the route who voiced their concerns. This area lay originally in the Borne area, 
but had since been reassigned to Almelo. It is also the area were the 
projected regional business park would be situated somewhere. The media 
lent extra force to their protest by inflating the negative picture that the 
landowners had sketched. 
 
The entire population of the region, including politicians, were thus able to 
enjoy the conspiracy theories and tales of dishonest government dealing. The 
media were also invited when the farmers involved organised an information 
meeting in one of their farmyards, to which they invited Almelo councillors, 
members of the provincial council, and even a member of Dutch parliament, 
to present their alternative to the Breakthrough. 
 
Where the stream passed through their area, their alternative reduced its 
width to the original 25 metres. The farmers did in fact support this original 25-
m width. They agreed that water needed more space to carry off rainwater. 
What actually annoyed them were the nature reserves on both banks of the 
Breakthrough, which they planned to scrap over a 3-km length. Besides the 
extra area, which would come from agricultural land, many farmers still feared 
that the nature reserves would impede their farming practices and any 
possible expansion, since they would be governed by environmental 
legislation. To meet the requirement for nature reserves shown in the 
Breakthrough plans, they had cooperated with Het Krikkenhaar, a nature 
group, to propose an exchange. The nature reserves alongside the 
Breakthrough would be substituted by a new nature reserve to be developed 
on land in the Krikkenhaar area. They realised that this would mean the 
disappearance of the ecological highway function, but they assumed that the 
Waterboard had only incorporated that to gain access to EU funding. When 
the process manager told them that the extra width was also necessary for 
engineering and water management reasons, they merely voiced their 
disbelief, as they did when they were told that they would receive generous 
compensation. 
 
Of course, while the process manager stoutly maintained that changes to the 
plans like those proposed were impossible, other invitees did seem to 
appreciate the alternative. The agricultural association, residents’ associations 
and even one of the political parties lent their support to the alternative plan. 
Some of the councillors and members of the provincial council stated they 
would study the alternative plan before deciding on amendments to the zoning 
plan that would make the Breakthrough with its ecological zones legally 
possible. The alternative plan thus posed a threat, in that the necessary 
zoning support might not be gained in one of the local authorities, even 
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though work on the first part of the route had already been going on for six 
months, and the ecological highway function was demanded by the province 
right from the start of the development of the concept.  
 
The alternative, coupled with the farmers’ continuing protests voiced directly 
to local politicians, led to conflict in the Almelo council and delayed the 
resolution on the Breakthrough within the council’s territory. 
 
Ultimately, in January 2005, they resolved to go ahead, after the waterboard 
had agreed to a regulation whereby agricultural use would be allowed for 
seven years in areas ultimately destined to become nature reserves. This 
gave them seven years to reach an agreement with the landowners. Also, part 
of the residents came to understand that the wide nature area would be an 
ideal buffer against the future extension towards their properties of a 
development that was even more threatening to them, the creation of a 
regional business park. Things did not completely quieten down after this 
decision. Some farmers attempted to get their way through the courts, but 
without success. 
 
From planning to implementation: still issues to be resolved 
After the die was finally cast in Almelo, it seemed that, despite all the 
research, there were still surprises in store. Unexpectedly, the bulldozers had 
encountered glacial boulders. Further research, a search for suitable earth 
moving equipment and a new round of tendering involved a delay of several 
months. Another delay was caused by the absence of a permit from the 
Ministry of Public Works. Even though the contractor’s clock was ticking, the 
Ministry followed the time-consuming, formal permit procedure, to the 
immense annoyance of the Breakthrough Steering Committee. Later, 
however, the Ministry performed a sterling service for the waterboard. Part of 
the Breakthrough was to cross motorway, which was not especially beneficial 
to nature, of course. It turned out, though, that the Ministry still had some 
funding available for an ecological pass way and was prepared to spend it on 
the Breakthrough. 
 
Negotiations proceeded apace on the subsequent parts of the route in 2006 
and 2007.  Almelo, for instance, had also planned a new housing estate near 
one part of the route, which meant that the gas and electricity providers would 
have to move existing underground supply lines. The parties with plans for the 
area through which the Breakthrough was to run collaborated, by agreeing a 
common timetable for their activities. The gas and electricity suppliers would 
do their work first, after which the ground would be excavated for the 
Breakthrough so that the local authority would be able to use the soil to raise 
the ground level of the new housing and industrial estates.  
 
Those parts of the route that had already been dug attracted a lot of attention 
as nature increasingly became established there. This increased the support 
from more and more of the residents, who made their positive views known to 
the waterboard. This support was a shot in the arm, one of a kind that is 
sorely needed in the years to follow as the Breakthrough is shaped to become 
a reality. 
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3.3  Actors and their motivation, cognitions and resources affecting 
the process 
 
As the case description shows, in the interaction processes surrounding the 
Breakthrough a number of objectives from more policy programmes than 
water management alone, became interlinked. This section presents an 
analysis of these interaction processes. Two of them are composed of two 
processes described above, while these pairs follow each other but stretch 
chronologically over a longer period and are therefore described in two parts 
in section 3.2. Like in Chapter 2 where the analytical framework is explained, 
the analysis is conducted at three levels. The processes are first explained in 
this section by considering the three characteristics of the parties involved that 
are central Contextual Interaction Theory: motivation, cognitions and 
resources. Thereafter the analysis goes on to deal with boundary judgments 
as part of the cognitions involved, in 3.4. Next in 3.5 the influence of the layers 
of contexts is studied: both the structural context of the governance structure 
and the wider contexts.  
 
Policy processes are viewed in Contextual Interaction Theory as interaction 
processes between actors (people, parts of organizations). Many factors can 
have an influence on their activities and interactions but only because and in 
as far as they change relevant characteristics of the involved actors. These 
characteristics are: their motives (that drive their actions), their cognitions 
(information held to be true) and their resources (providing capacity and 
power). Figure 2.4 in section 2.3 specified how these characteristics are 
formed. 
 
Initial plan development 
The interactions between the waterboard and the provincial government that 
led to the Breakthrough being linked to the provincial planning and zoning 
policy, the National Ecological Network policy and the land reallocation policy 
together form a first interaction process to be analysed. 
 
 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fishery 
 
  
Waterboard       Province 
 
 
  Land Reallocation Committee 
 
Figure 3.1, Actor constellation initial plan development on the Breakthrough 
 
 
Linking the Breakthrough to the provincial zoning and planning policy can be 
understood in terms of the characteristics (motivation, cognitions, resources – 
see figure 2.4) of the Waterboard and the Provincial Government. There was 
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a clear congruence between the objectives of the provincial zoning and 
planning policy and that of the waterboard, which were both served by 
constructing the Breakthrough. 
 
Provincial policy in fact aimed to maintain and improve nature by linking 
natural areas, while the waterboard concentrated on linking relatively natural 
wet infrastructure. These objectives were very much in accord with one 
another12. The cognitions were also in accord, which, together with the 
overlapping motivations, explains how the Waterboard could easily link the 
Breakthrough to the area plan when they were in talks with the province in the 
Governmental Steering Committee. 
 
In terms of resources, even when the waterboard would not have particularly 
liked the provincial objectives, the critical dependence of the Waterboard on 
the Provincial Government actually offered the latter the opportunity to 
increase its influence by cooperating in linking the Breakthrough to the local 
planning. In fact linking the National Ecological Network policy with the 
Breakthrough was done in the expectation that this would increase efficiency. 
The provincial government was also motivated by financial considerations 
when the Breakthrough was given a place in a land reallocation project for an 
area through which the Breakthrough would pass, while they linked the 
timetable for this reallocation project to the timetable for the amendment of 
(national) land reallocation policy. This had to be done, since funding from the 
planning policy could only be used for the Breakthrough if the project were to 
be undertaken under the amended land reallocation policy.  
 
 
Detailing and presenting the plan 
 
In this process it is especially the triple presentation of the new more detailed 
plans to the public that deserves attention. It is clear that this was done 
differently than the first initial presentation. The actors are the Steering 
Committee that guided the elaboration of the plans, the Waterboard that not 
only took a strong role in the detailing but also in the presentation and the 
audience that responded generally with constructive remarks in this phase.  
 
                                            
12 An objective is in accord – or ‘congruent’ - with another objective when the realization of the 
first objective makes the realization of the second easier.  It is not necessary that they are 
identical. Likewise, objectives are conflicting when realization of the one makes realization of 
the other more difficult and independent when realization of the one doesn’t influence the 
difficulty of realizing the other.  
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The actor constellation was: 
 
Steering Committee 
    
elaboration of plan 
 
Waterboard 
 
 presenting the plan 
 
Public: audience of presentations 
 
Figure 3.2, Actor constellation presentation elaborated plan on the 
Breakthrough 
 
It seems that the waterboard had a genuine motivation to discuss the plans in 
a rather open way with the audience and that the audiences also perceived 
this to be the case (cognitions). In fact, this could be a well-understood self-
interest on the side of the waterboard, as a method that it had learned worked 
better than a strict develop-announce-defend strategy. However the 
adaptations made following the meetings also support the idea that the 
openness was more that just tactics. At the background the considerable 
power for the people to hinder the progress of the project with the resource of 
legal objections might nevertheless play an important role.  
 
 
Dealing with physical planning in the first part of the trajectory 
 
The third interaction process analysed is that by which the Breakthrough 
linked up with the Wierden local authority’s spatial planning policy. It is 
described above in section 3.2 under the headings of “Fear for nature” and 
later “Bypassing the physical plan for the first trajectory”. It can be understood 
in terms of the characteristics of the alderman, local council, and landowners, 
in the local authority’s area, with the Waterboard’s characteristics included as 
backgrounds. 
 
           Wierden Local Authority 
 
 
Waterboard                   Alderman                Landowners 
 
 
 
                        Local council 
 
Figure 3.3, Actor constellation physical planning in the first part of the 
trajectory in the Breakthrough case 
 
The alderman responsible for planning exerted the most positive influence on 
the link between the Breakthrough and planning policy in Wierden. His 
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positive influence can be understood first of all in terms of his motivations. 
The goals of the water policy that the Breakthrough would fulfil partly matched 
those of the alderman’s planning policy: countering drought. The nature goals 
associated with the Breakthrough also fitted in with the alderman’s planning 
goals. His support for the Breakthrough also linked up with the alderman’s 
desire for good external relations with other tiers of government. The 
motivation here stemmed in part from his own goals, as well as from the 
realisation that Wierden local authority often depended on, and would 
continue to depend on other levels of government, including the waterboard. 
 Moreover, the alderman shared with the waterboard the view 
(cognitions) that the Breakthrough in fact would counter drought in Wierden, 
while he appreciated that his function and personal character were resources 
he could use to link the Breakthrough to the Wierden planning policy (self-
effectiveness assessment). The match between his goals and cognition with 
those of the waterboard, and his position as resource, explain the support 
offered by the alderman. 
 
Landowners Given the favourable configuration of motivation, cognition and 
resource position, the alderman’s cooperation was understandable, but was in 
itself not sufficient to forge the link between the Breakthrough and the 
Wierden planning policy. This needed both the local council and to some 
degree also the landowners. The landowners were initially against the 
Breakthrough which, given their characteristics as actors, can be explained as 
follows. They were in principle in favour of a link between planning and water 
policy by means of an amendment to the zoning plans. The water policy goals 
matched their own, which clarifies their motives for supporting that part of the 
plan. Nevertheless, most of the landowners were on balance against a link 
between the Breakthrough and ‘their’ zoning plan, due to the other policy that 
linked with the Breakthrough. 
 In their perception (interpretation of reality - cognitions), the link with 
the National Ecological Network would bring with it restrictions on their 
business practices, while most of them regarded their agricultural businesses 
as a serious resource, which most of them wanted to expand. In this regard, 
their cognitions differed from the waterboard’s, which saw no reason to fear 
any such restrictions. 
 The link between the Breakthrough and the Enter village land 
reallocation project was not a problem for the landowners as such, but linking 
the timetable for this project to amendments in parliament certainly affected 
their motivation adversely, since it meant postponing the land reallocation 
project’s implementation. The risk of regulation and postponement of the land 
reallocation weighed particularly heavily with the landowners because they 
perceived that the provincial government could also site the ecological 
highway elsewhere, where it would pose no threat to their farming. 
 So both the motivation and the cognitions of the landowners differed 
greatly from those of the waterboard, which offered little chance that the 
landowners would easily cooperate in the linkage. 
 There was little chance that they would cooperate, either, due to the 
unequal distribution of resources between the landowners and the 
waterboard. The waterboard had no resources to compel cooperation, since a 
condition of the cooperation with Wierden was that the Breakthrough would be 
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incorporated into the land reallocation project, provided the landowners 
agreed voluntarily. The landowners, however, did have a resource available 
by which they could make the waterboard keep its distance. By expressing 
their dissatisfaction directly to the local councillors and the media, they 
exerted an adverse influence on the motivation of the local councillors. It was 
not electorally favourable for them to support the linkage, while their 
cooperation was indispensable. It was they, after all, who would have to 
approve the change to the local zoning plan. They utilised this resource right 
up to the point when the alderman succeeded in persuading the landowners 
that it was also in their interest to link the local zoning plan to the 
Breakthrough. 
 
Councillors The local councillors were initially less enthusiastic than the 
alderman, thanks to the adverse influence of the landowners, which affected 
their motivation to work on linking the Breakthrough with local zoning policy.  
Their objections dissipated when agreement was reached with the 
landowners, who ceased to express their resistance to the councillors. 
Nevertheless, this was not enough to motivate the councillors, since two 
objections to the link remained. It was in fact inherent to the link with planning 
policy via the local zoning plan that planning blight compensation would have 
to be paid. The costs involved would legally have to be born by the local 
authority. The second objection was the cost of changing the zoning plan. In 
the councillors’ view, the council was unjustified in tapping its own resources 
for a project that in fact served the interests of other tiers of government. The 
Waterboard agreed to bear these feared costs itself. 
 That changed the councillors’ perceptions about of linking the 
Breakthrough to ‘their’ zoning plans. They expected no further adverse 
consequences for the Wierden local authority, which offered them sufficient 
motivation to agree. 
 
 
Dealing with physical planning in the second part of the trajectory 
 
The fourth process analysed is composed of the interactions by which the 
Breakthrough was linked to the Almelo local authority’s zoning policy, 
including the Regional Business Park and the building of a new residential 
area. This process has been described above in section 3.2 under the 
headings ‘Hot land’ and “Nature against nature”. The link between the 
Breakthrough and the Almelo zoning policy was forged again mainly via 
interaction of the alderman with the council and the landowners with the 
Waterboard at the background. 
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                 Almelo Local Authority 
 
 
Waterboard                    Alderman                  Landowners 
 
 
 
Local Council 
 
Figure 3.4, Actor constellation in round three of the Breakthrough case 
 
 
The Almelo alderman’s interest in this case was only tepid at best, because of 
his cognitions: he did not initially acknowledge that Almelo had anything to 
gain from the Breakthrough, presented as it was as a solution to nature and 
water budget problems, while the Almelo alderman saw himself as 
responsible for urban issues. Nor was he entirely successful in picking up the 
signal that the waterboard expected him to recruit support for the 
Breakthrough from his constituency. 
 The high water levels in 1998 increased the perception of risk and did 
affect the alderman’s interpretation of what the project could achieve 
positively, so when the Provincial Government tied the Breakthrough’s 
construction to the establishment of a Regional Business Park in Almelo, the 
alderman’s motivation rose to the point where he cooperated on the 
Breakthrough. The increase of motivation continued when it turned out that 
sand released by excavating the Breakthrough could be used for building a 
housing estate. Thanks to a link between the Breakthrough and the zoning 
plan, they would be able to save money. 
 
The agricultural landowners in Almelo were not at first sufficiently motivated 
by the link between the Breakthrough and the zoning plan to offer their 
support. Just like their peers in Wierden, they too were wary of the regulations 
under the National Ecological Network. They also assumed that they would 
suffer from over-irrigation, a point on which their cognition differed from that of 
the waterboard. When the waterboard sought intensive contact with these 
landowners, suspicion declined about the research that formed the input to 
the waterboard’s cognitions. Some landowners even became motivated by 
the Breakthrough when it turned out that the Regional Business Park would 
be built quite near them. In comparison to the alternative scenario, in which 
only the Regional Business Park would be built, which would destroy their 
view (and maybe even could threaten to swallow their lands in the future), the 
alternative with the Breakthrough acting as a buffer was suddenly a relative 
improvement. Another positive cognitive change influencing their motivation 
was that they acknowledged the waterboard’s openness in linking their 
individual interests to the Breakthrough. For example, an extra bridge was 
added to the Breakthrough to preserve an existing footpath. 
 
The Local Council was in these circumstances quite hesitant and postponed 
the decision until there was sufficient relaxation of the objections of at least 
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part of the residents / landowners. Clearly it had the legal resources to force a 
decision but was not motivated to do so at all before this point.  
 
 
Getting funds 
 
The next process, and the last one to be analysed, comprises the interactions 
between the project leader and the Waterboard Council, project leaders of 
foreign water authorities and the bureau managing the European Interreg 
subsidy, which linked the Breakthrough to the European grant. It was 
described above in section 3.2 under the heading “Gold rush”.  
 
 
         Waterboard Council              European Union 
 
     subsidy-rules 
         
  Waterboard  
  project leader    Interreg Bureau 
  
 
  Foreign water authorities 
 
Figure 3.5, Actor constellation surrounding round four in the Breakthrough 
case 
 
The project leader’s characteristics play an important role here. He had an 
intrinsic motivation and interest in the world of subsidies, which focused his 
cognition: it made him very receptive to information on the subject. His self-
confidence and experience formed a significant resource, which helped him 
forge links. He was bold enough to apply for grant funding, even when it was 
uncertain whether the Regge & Dinkel Council would offer the necessary 
support if and when the grant was actually made available. The Regge & 
Dinkel Council was uncertain since they had the perception that the 
Breakthrough might not be financially feasible, which hindered them from 
offering their total support to the project. These doubts disappeared when the 
Regge & Dinkel Council became aware that grant funding had already been 
obtained. This changed the perception about financial feasibility and thus also 
the motivation to cooperate on the link with the grant by making resources 
(credit) available for the Breakthrough. 
 
The motivation for two foreign water authorities to link into the project 
stemmed from the perception that the funding they needed to achieve their 
goals would reduce thanks to the grant, combined with the knowledge that the 
grant was conditional on cooperation and knowledge-sharing between water 
authorities from different countries. 
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3.4  Boundary judgments and their impacts 
 
Boundary judgments are definitions of systems and problems that underpin 
conceptual models. For the purpose of our case study they can be defined as 
socially constructed definitions of the domain of relevance (in terms of 
relevant scales, problem and policy sectors and time and change aspects – 
see figure 2.9). Boundary judgments that differ among actors can cause 
incoherence and can even be a source of conflict. Boundary judgments that 
are too narrow for the adequate use of the innovation or so wide that 
complexity becomes unmanageable and can also stop all progress.  
 
In this section we will wonder what kind of boundary judgments of the actors 
involved can be observed and how they could have influenced the actor 
characteristics and the resulting processes. Some relevant boundary 
spanning was already mentioned as instances of “coupling”. The project 
combines the water policy goals of 1) separating rural and urban water by re-
coupling a natural creek system to the main stream of the region, 2) drought 
prevention, and 3) flood protection and the goals from other policy fields of 4) 
ecological highway (nature), 5) land reallocation (agriculture), 6) buffer zone 
(industry), and 7) landscape and recreation. Some of these couplings didn’t 
really have the character of “boundary disputes” over the relevant domain 
while there actually wasn’t disagreement about the coupling. But there are 
more boundary judgments that are recognisable and had an impact on the 
process. Like in section 2.4 we discern spatial, sectoral and temporal aspects 
of the domain.  
 
Spatial aspects of the domain 
In this case we have seen that the area where the options for the trajectory of 
the new river were searched rather quickly shirked to only one trajectory. At 
that time this happened without much debate. It was the product of a multi-
criteria analysis, thus the kind of decision that most of the actors considered 
suited for rational (analytical) decision making, not a complex or wicked 
problem. To some degree it’s the nature of water itself, in combination with 
the wish to create something ‘natural’ that seem to dictate the route. On the 
other hand, even the trajectory chosen has to pass (under) a major shipping 
canal. Clearly this decision of the majority of actors conflicted with the 
preference of the agricultural association. But one can doubt whether this can 
be labeled a ‘boundary judgment’ conflict, or whether it was not just a matter 
of conflicting interests. Nevertheless there were different boundary domain 
perceptions involved. Most farmers concentrated on what the project would 
imply for their own lands, while the waterboard’s perspective of linking a creek 
system to the east of the area to the main river to the west of the area implies 
a lot larger area considered as the relevant spatial domain.  
 Somewhat later the spatial domain of the project was greatly expanded 
in a way by the coupling to the Ecological Highway structure that ultimately 
links nature areas in large parts of the country or even Europe. This was a 
domain specification that was clearly not understood when opponents wanted 
to take the natural banks of some part of the project and “compensate” this by 
offering to create nature elsewhere. Initially even some provincial councilors 
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were lured into regarding this as possibly a fair deal, while it completely 
“missed the point”.  
 At the same stage and place another development lead to a significant 
extension of the spatial domain deemed relevant by the population. This was 
the regional business park for which the Breakthrough would provide a strong 
and wide buffer zone. This extension greatly helped to relax the objections.  
 
Sectoral aspects of the domain 
As listed above, several policy sectors ultimately contributed purposes to the 
project, apart from the water quality and two sided water quantity goals. In the 
course of the case story the emphasis between these three shifted now and 
then, but none was excluded. While the included water goals were almost 
non-contested, like the addition of landscape and recreation, and the function 
as a buffer zone for industry was even welcomed as soon as recognized as 
part of the ‘sectoral domain’ of the project, nature and agriculture (land 
reallocation) were less generally accepted.  
 At first one sees a very smooth addition of nature purposes to the 
water project, when the waterboard and the province wholeheartedly 
welcomed each other’s sectors in the project. They regarded this clearly as a 
win-win option for which it was not difficult to open up one’s minds. But the 
relation with the sector of agriculture became stressed by this addition. This 
was only reinforced by the coupling of the project to land reallocation (a sector 
rooted in agricultural infrastructure improvement policies). In fact this tension 
can also be viewed as a boundary judgment conflict in which the farmers held 
the wider definition of the domain. Because, it were they who included all 
European and national habitat protection rules into the relevant domain, as 
interlinked with the inclusion of the “ecological highway” – an inclusion 
contested by the Waterboard.  
  
Temporal aspects of the domain 
The coherence of the different time frames of the sectors and procedures 
involved was also in this case a serious problem. Inclusion of land reallocation 
could only provide new resources for the project when a change of the law 
was awaited even though this hampered the progress. The long time horizon 
of the EIS procedure was successfully made more coherent with the project’s 
development by splitting the assessment in two.  
 Like in the North South Meene case the requirements of the European 
subsidy (in this case the JAF program) were highly complicating the time 
management of the project. Demands to realize concrete action in the short 
run are actually conflicting with the lengthy procedures of spatial planning. 
When successful, one can say in hindsight that such pressures have speeded 
up the process. But they also create great risks for the project, because when 
a deadline is not met, the completion of the project might become hardly 
unaffordable, while it is too far ahead to be stopped either, beyond the 
subjective ‘point of no return’.  
 An interesting spatio-temporal issue in this regard is also the split of the 
project in different phases, of which in this study two have been dealt with (a 
third one is also essential for the project, a planned fourth one is a side arm). 
The point here is not that the actual building of the waterway is split into 
phases, but that also the project is starting to be actually realized on one spot 
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while the development of ideas, resources and permissions still continues for 
another part of the trajectory. This might seem a risky style, yet the project 
managers have learned that it’s the only way to realize such projects. It is 
impossible to wait for all foundations to be laid, before actually starting. This 
strategy is not only used on the level of phases (stretches of the trajectory) 
but also on the more detailed level of plots of land that can be easily obtained 
because a farmer wants to retire and welcomes the nature development 
adjacent to his farm house. This creates plots of examples that are used later 
to convince neighboring farmers that the results are worthwhile and present 
this development as inevitable and even already happening.  
 While it is clear form this description that boundary issues are 
abundant, all in all one could also state that in this case waterboard, province 
and most municipalities have shown a sufficient degree of openness towards 
each others domain specifications to enable progress in the project.  
 
 
3.5  Layers of contexts  
 
The inputs into the process and also the characteristics of the actors involved 
are not isolated. They have a context at several scales that all can have 
directly an impact on the process (see figure 2.10 in section 2.5). 
 
Specific inputs 
The specific inputs for this process, both previous decisions and policy 
documents and the specific social-geographical circumstances of the area 
have been dealt with in the description of the process in section 3.1 and 3.2.  
 
Structural context 
The structural context consists of the elements of public governance and the 
property and use rights, that are not specifically developed for the processes 
studied. Innovations often require new combinations of: scales, actors, 
perspectives, strategies and resources, than the ones that have developed in 
the past for more conventional purposes (Bressers and Kuks, 2003, 2004). 
This implies that the extent of relevant elements of governance has to be 
widened. The real boundary spanning challenge however is not the widening 
of the extent, but the protection or regaining of the coherence within and 
between these elements. To what degree was the degree of governance 
coherence a troublesome context for the process?  
 The levels and scales context shows all levels involved, from the 
European (directives, subsidies), the national (policies, finance), the provincial 
(e.g. main actor for nature development), the regional waterboard, the local 
(e.g. physical planning), groups of citizen and farmers, up and including 
individuals (e.g. land owners). While the European and national levels were 
not directly active as actors in the process, their policies are inspiring much of 
the action and they have been contacted as sources of finance. A national 
‘administrative agreement on water management’ between the relevant state, 
provincial, waterboard and local authorities has created some degree of clarity 
at least for the water quantity issues involved. The Province took quite an 
active role to use the potential of the project as nature development and to 
accommodate (buffer, in fact) the planned regional business park. The 
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coupling of the development of the business park to the project also created 
an extra motivation supporting the project with the municipality of Almelo.  
More complicated was the relation between the national and local level when 
to add financial resources it was decided to link the project to the land 
reallocation scheme. While the national law governing such land reallocation 
projects was about to be changed in such a way that contributions to the 
project were made possible, it effectually lead to postponing the already 
agreed upon land reallocation project (to the regret and thus de-motivation of 
local farmers).  A third issue here was the relation between the European and 
national level (nature policies) and the group and local levels, when citizens, 
farmers and even council members proposed to interrupt the wide natural 
river banks for some miles and proposed alternative nature development 
elsewhere. Though initiated from an interest (motivational) perspective, this 
clearly also had a cognitive side, since it was also rooting in a 
misunderstanding of the whole point of creating an ecological highway 
infrastructure.  
 There was no ready networks and actors context from which just a 
regional subgroup could be tapped and activated for this project. The initiator 
was clearly the waterboard. The addition to the project by the province, using 
the project for the ecological highway network, made both the area and the 
budget much larger, giving in principle the province, not the waterboard the 
role of prime actor. Nevertheless the waterboard kept playing that role in 
practice, maintaining and sometimes creating relations with all necessary 
governmental and non governmental organisations and groups. The province 
however at key moments stood actively aside to further the progress of the 
project. In the part of the trajectory where the larger municipality of Almelo 
was a key player because of its physical planning powers, the ‘rural’ 
orientation of the project (land, nature, creeks) did not fit well with the urban 
aspirations of the city, causing some disinterest. Later the inclusion of a large 
part of a rural municipality into the urban municipality of Almelo made the 
extended municipality opening up to the ‘rural’ issues at stake.  
 With this already the next governance context is touched, that of the 
relevant problem perceptions and goal ambitions. To start with a positive 
issue: the vision of integrated water management, in which quantity and 
quality issues but also nature protection finds a place and openness towards 
other issues is part of the vision, has been accepted among most actors and 
has certainly helped to merge problem perceptions, leading to quickly joint 
boundary judgments in the cognitions of waterboard and province (see 
above). The ‘easy’ coupling of nature development with the initial water 
project can serve as an example of this. Nevertheless local authorities have 
often problem perceptions of their own that might or might not be reconcilable 
with those of integrated water management. Among groups and individuals 
(and sometimes their local councillors) such inclusive views are often lacking. 
The waterboard as project manager has sometimes responded by its 
“marketing strategy”. For instance when the high waters of 1998 were creating 
high awareness of this risk among the public, the purpose of the project – one 
of several – to mitigate such risks was quickly placed in the spotlights.  
 The strategies and instruments context shows a lot of incoherence, 
especially in connection to the responsibilities and resources for 
implementation context. A project like the Breakthrough has to rely on many 
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instruments that are designed for purposes that represent only part of its own 
array of goals. Clearly this is the case with the dependency on the local 
authority’s cooperation to acquire rights under the zoning plan to dig the 
Breakthrough. Having to satisfy the requirements, time schedules, and 
preferences of implementing actors simultaneously resembles for the project 
manager playing a simultaneous chess game in which one not only has to win 
all, but even all at approximately the same time. The best hope one can have 
under such circumstances is that the web of resources dependencies is 
sufficiently mutual to give all involved a stake. The institutional distribution of 
responsibilities, resources and instruments explains the interdependence that 
arose between the provincial government and the Waterboard in the 
implementation of national government policy. Framed within the problem 
perspective that the quality of nature was ascribed to water quality, the 
province was partly dependent on the efforts of the waterboard, which was 
responsible for water goals. This is however far from always true, creating 
great risks for the project. Thus, project managers of such project are urged to 
become masters of “adaptive implementation”. Much of this adaptive action 
could well be labelled “boundary spanning”.  
 
Wider contexts 
From the 1970s on, increasing prosperity led to a paradox, in that nature and 
its relation to water received greater attention, while the simultaneous demand 
for space increased, bringing with it disruptions and threats to nature. 
Increased prosperity in the 1990s led to even greater demand for housing and 
industrial areas. The demand encouraged developers to become active in the 
land market, thus driving land prices up.  The water rose to flood levels in 
1995 and 1998. This caused all levels, from the EU down to the individual, to 
realise that increasing demand for space, coupled with the subsequent 
building and use of that space, was increasing the risk of flooding.  
 
 
3.6 Receptivity and its impacts 
 
Receptivity is the ability of an actor to associate and exploit new knowledge 
around existing knowledge, activities and objectives (Jeffrey and Seaton 
2003/4). While it is connected to the cognitive aspect of human behaviour in 
this formulation one can imagine that “adaptive implementation” also and 
likewise requires that motivations remain flexible enough to incorporate new 
ones that might serve the interests or ideals of actors and to be able to 
creatively combine resources in new ways to support intended actions 
(compare figure 2.4 in section 2.6). The role of receptivity in the process as a 
whole can in principle also refer to the receptivity of the set of actors as a 
network. Here we will however concentrate on one crucial actor, the 
waterboard.  
 
The waterboard of Regge and Dinkel that is the government organisation that 
is relevant here has developed an interesting “corporate identity” in this 
respect. It claims to work under the self developed approach of “contextual 
water management” (Kuks 2005). This approach is rooted in the 
acknowledgement that water is part of the physical environment that fulfils 
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many more functions and serves corresponding interests than water issues 
alone and in the acknowledgement that it is impossible to attain the water 
goals and standards by action on its own. The cooperation of others is 
unavoidable and should thus be placed first and foremost in the water 
management strategy. A starting point, not a selling tactic. This involves an 
orientation on what values the water might have or can get in the perspectives 
of those other actors and trying to realise these potential values. It also 
involved continuous interaction with the actors in the context, whether or not 
there is a concrete issue at stake at the moment. Searching for (proxies to) 
win-win solutions is an important practice. This implies that water goals are 
not uniformly applicable, but that they should be differentiated depending on 
the context, also the social context. Of course there remain legal and policy 
frameworks that guide the effort, but they should and often do provide leeway. 
Accepted is that the outcomes thus become uncertain, in the sense that they 
cannot be “planned” on beforehand – as is the usual engineering approach – 
and even that they will likely be “sub-optimal” when viewed solely from a 
water system perspective. Interaction with other parties only makes sense 
when you know the frameworks and whether there is some leeway. Often the 
frameworks that are given do give leeway, but also need further specification 
to become practicable.  
 Generally the tactical and operational levels need more attention. This 
urges deliberate choices of styles (from authoritative to participatory), which 
often result in a more interactive approach to policy implementation, implying 
among others to: 
- involve different levels and actors from the start,  
- try to involve issues and actors that can become bottlenecks at later 
stages already from the start, learning while doing,  
- produce showcases where and when possible even while elsewhere 
still in a negotiation phase. 
Such style needs an own organization made ‘fit’ for this kind of flexible and 
relation-oriented style. In a sense it needs promoting cultural changes: 
- to be prepared to go beyond water system functional thinking, 
- to have the guts to start an open implementation process without 
knowing what it will produce in the end, 
- to accept the flexibility and uncertainty for the program or pace of 
progress, 
- to be able to shift from one style to another when the context demand a 
different approach.  
 While such an announced approach is of course not simply identical 
with the day to day practice of the waterboard officials, it is not hard to 
recognize much of this spirit in the way the waterboard has been and is 
handling the Breakthrough case, especially in the later years.  
 
 
3.7 Managing complexity by boundary spanning  
 
Managing complexity requires boundary spanning across sectors, scales and 
time perspectives. This coupling can specifically regard the boundary 
judgements – as a precondition for fruitful cooperation – which is the core of 
interest of the ISBP project, but also the wider and practical boundary 
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spanning that is required to make the project run. Often the division between 
the two is not very clear, while creating fruitful cooperation across boundaries 
can also be one of the best methods to gradually integrate the boundary 
judgments of the actors involved. The relationship between (restricted or 
divergent) boundary judgments of the actors involved affecting the 
cooperation in the process, thus can also be reversed in as far as reasonably 
successful interaction and cooperation can help boundary judgments to “open 
up”.  
 
In many respects this case shows very quick adaptations of actors to wider 
boundary judgments of others (see sector 3.4). The waterboard started off in 
this sphere by seeking the involvement of various parties directly from the 
start. The provincial initiative to link the project with nature development was 
welcomed as a chance and not as a threat by the waterboard. They were 
however not the only actors that mattered … 
 
There are only two issues were boundary judgments really clashed. The first 
one is the role of agriculture vs. nature development in the project, with all 
kinds of spatial consequences. The other consists of the different time frames 
of the various sectoral rules, like EU subsidies and physical planning 
procedures. In fact these merged in practice into one, since the time 
pressures from the EU subsidy regulations were most threatened by the 
tension between farmers and the nature development ambition of the project 
that was a condition sine qua non for the province and became a dear goal for 
the waterboard.  
 
During the initial plan development phase the spatial boundaries of the new 
river area were on the one hand narrowed down very quickly to the trajectory 
chosen and on the other hand widened enormously by making it part of the 
national ecological highway structure. This openness of the waterboard and 
the province for each others sectoral interests and their spatial consequences 
was however not followed by the farmers and agricultural interest groups. The 
inclusion of agricultural interests in the project is unavoidable since most of 
the land owners that will have to cooperate one way or another are farmers. 
Therefore it was not a strange idea to link the project to the land reallocation 
scheme concerning the same area. The project was however also linked to 
the creating of the national ecological highway structure, not only with a 
different spatial scale of consideration, but also with potentially conflicting 
rules and values. The waterboard responded with a whole array of strategies 
(see also section 4.2). 
 
New actors and arenas were used: 
- hiring an independent chair with own interesting network connections,  
- appointing a singular spokesman to deal with the press, keeping away 
from failure, and inviting press at successes 
- using the land reallocation steering committee as a platform, 
- making as much as possible use of ally’s, like the province in some 
cases and local aldermen in others, avoiding to be central in every 
game. 
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Some can be labeled creating new cognitions and trust by open 
communication and exchange:   
- quite open and also very active communication to the inhabitants, 
including home visits, 
- actually using as much of their proposals as could be fitted in,  
- showing off with small realized plots to gain support and momentum. 
 
Others are a bit more manipulative, or should we say steering communication, 
that is directed somewhat closer to influencing motivation, be it still with 
predominantly communication: 
- marketing the project on the basis of the purposes closest at the heart 
of the inhabitants in a certain place and time,  
- playing down the risks of habitat protection rules applying to the area 
sooner or later. 
 
The last category consists of facilitating and compromising, were the 
waterboard really transfers resources to make the project more attractive to 
(potential) critics;  
- commissioning an external consultancy to prepare a draft zoning plan 
for a municipality, 
- promising to take some risks on board that were frightening opponents, 
like planning blights, 
- at an essential moment: compromising to let agriculture continue for 
the first seven years.  
 
In these ways gradually much of the opposition was overcome.  
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4.  Comparison, convergence and conclusions 
 
 
4.1  Two cases compared 
 
In this report two cases are being studied in some detail. Though in many 
respects their problematic is comparable, they were not completely 
simultaneous in time. The North and South Meene case was mostly evolving 
in the period of 1998 – 2002, while the bigger and even more complex 
Breakthrough case started only a bit later, but is mostly evolving from 2000 
onwards and to a large extent is still continuing at the moment this report is 
written (2008), while the planning aims at completion in 2014.  
 This has some relevant implications for the structural (governance) 
context of these processes. The quantitative water task overview of WB21, 
the National Administrative Agreement on Water Management (between all 
relevant authorities) and the fully felt pressure of the requirements of the 
European Water Framework directive and the national and European 
ecological highway policies were not yet present or influential in the North and 
South Meene case, while they certainly are in the Breakthrough case. In many 
respects North and South Meene was a pioneer project in its sort. All in all, 
the structural governance context has improved.  
 A second difference is that the waterboard of Regge and Dinkel in the 
later case was much better prepared to face the complexity – and even to 
look for it when these sectors, actors and rules seem to be unavoidable 
sometime in the process anyhow – than the waterboard in the North and 
South Meene case that more or less stumbled into it (no wonder, pioneers as 
they were). The inclusion of more purposes into the water management 
initiated Breakthrough project, even to the extent that formally it is now as 
much a nature development as a water project, was met with a very adaptive 
attitude.  
 
 
4.2  Five intervention points for convergence mechanisms 
 
Such adaptive attitude needs a strategy for the convergence of the views of 
the actors involved. To realise better conditions for boundary spanning in the 
process various intervention points can be recognised (Bressers 2007b). In 
figure 4.1 the various intervention points were convergence mechanisms 
could work are shown. 
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Figure 4.1, Process model with the arena, the actors and their characteristics 
used in Contextual Interaction Theory shown as possible intervention points 
for convergence mechanisms 
 
Actors and arena’s 
New actors can enter the scene, creating other network relations. For 
instance “policy brokers” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999), for which 
boundary spanning is core business. Or media actors that expose the issue to 
a wider public or NGO’s. Also new arena’s, meeting points with specific 
characteristics, can help bridging boundary judgments and wider issues. 
These can consist for instance of all kinds of organised meetings, 
associations or committees. These serve to create dialogues that enable 
changes. In our cases examples are the multi-actor steering committees that 
were installed, the search for an adequate setting (integrated area-oriented 
policy in the North and South Meene case or – partially – land reallocation in 
the Breakthrough case), and the appointment of an independent project 
manager in the Breakthrough case.  
 
Cognitions 
While boundary judgments are considered part of actor’s cognitions, 
influencing these cognitions can involve the use of documents and reports 
(studies with new or gathered information, or white papers with policy 
positions), of which the visibility can be multiplied by media attention. We saw 
that for instance in the Breakthrough case were the media voiced “conspiracy 
theories and tales of dishonest government dealing”. Furthermore, as 
cognitions of actors are influenced through the filtering process by which 
observations are processed, stories, analogies, one-liners etceteras that 
change these reference frames can be important. Of course also own learning 
processes based on own experiences can influence actor’s cognitions, like 
when the flood crisis occurred in the North and South Meene case. Such 
experiences can also be deliberately furthered by job training and collegial 
information exchanges, like we did in workshops at waterboards13.  
                                            
13 In February 2008 we held a workshop at the waterboard of Regge and Dinkel (with also 
representatives of a neighboring waterboard) discussing with project managers, elected 
Arena: 
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Motivation 
Own learning is also dependent on motivation, think of the concept of 
selective perception. Both the positive or negative direction and the saliency 
of motivations are important here. Sometimes motivations can also be seen 
as “intervention points” themselves. For instance when new and for that 
reason yet uncomfortable goals are in fact in correspondence with actor’s 
interests or when it is a matter of coping with external pressures (e.g. by 
“constraining mechanisms”, Dinica 2007). In fact much of the sectoral 
boundary spanning in both cases is such a mix of discovery of corresponding 
interests and recognition of mutual dependency. This brings us to the last 
point of action for convergence mechanisms.   
 
Resources 
Such pressures are dependent on resources, which therefore become an 
intervention point of their own too. The position of the actor in terms of power 
depends on its image of strength in the network, on crucial moments 
confirmed – or not – by its position in mutual resource dependencies with 
other actors. The pressure needs not to be negative. Having enough of the 
resource “money” can also for instance open the option to change the 
motivation of other actors by compensation, like the promises of the 
waterboard in both cases to compensate planning blights. Resources like 
skilled people, equipment and money can affect cognitions more directly by 
the learning capacity of actors and thus their receptivity, the ability of an actor 
to associate and exploit new knowledge around existing knowledge, activities 
and objectives. For influencing other actors’ cognitions, relevant resources are 
the centrality and respect and trust the coordinating actor has in the network. 
                                                                                                                             
administrators and civil servants more than a dozen “dilemma’s” when dealing with this kind 
of multi-purpose complex water projects and the actors involved. These were:  
External: 
- starting talks with an early draft or with a full fletched plan  
- starting realization of works when and where possible or waiting for the full scale plan to be  
agreed 
- making agreements with others informal and flexible or formal and fixed 
- consulting with others in one to one contacts or in network meetings 
- striving for keeping the project under own direction or have others pull the chart 
- declaring to strive for “win-win” solutions, creating cooperation, or too high expectations and 
thus disappointments 
- working it out together with the “partners” with much flexibility and exchange options or 
standing firm for the water goals (& how about support from your own organization for 
interesting compromises?) 
Internal: 
- giving a generous mandate to the project manager or accountable targets  
- using one person as ambassador (for clarity and uniformity) or using multiple people (for 
effectiveness) 
- standing as elected officials behind the project manager for support or actively interfering 
- coordination between parts of the own organization in an informal, direct and flexible way or 
with agreed upon procedures and reporting requirements 
- responding to the actual developments in the case situation or keep heading in a straight 
line for the long term purpose 
- capturing the luring prospects of coupling extra project goals (with resources, actors and 
rules involved) or being restrictive because of the human and financial capacity of the 
organization given the risks taken.   
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Hiring an independent project manager that comes from another organization 
that is trusted by the opponents (Breakthrough) makes this circle round again.  
 
 
4.3  Conclusion: “Do’s, don’ts and dilemma’s” 
 
The points of action for convergence mechanisms show the way, but not the 
action. To conclude the analyses on the two cases presented above we 
derive some practical lessons that can be drawn while managing such 
multiple purpose water management cases of high complexity.  
 
Do’s 
Do formulate agreements and / or regulations on the national level that 
form institutions that smoothen rather than hamper convergence. Since 
boundary spanning is often a matter of coordination without hierarchy such 
institutions could be framework regulations or agreements between 
representatives of actors that belong to the usual suspects of the type of 
processes involved. In this case the structural governance context was 
assessed as that there was no ready structural context for the realisation of 
this innovation and that the extended one that followed the spanning of 
sectors and scales was incoherent. In the Netherlands a broad “administrative 
agreement” on responsibilities and resources for implementation (NBW), 
agreed upon task overviews (WB21), and new procedures (GGOR, Water 
test) were introduced after most of the story of this case had already 
developed. They provide a somewhat improved context to new projects, like 
the Breakthrough compared to North and South Meene cases. 
Do formulate an agreement on regional level in which all actors – both 
administrative and private – agree to cooperate under “normal societal and 
administrative conditions”. This goes beyond the idea of an administrative 
agreement between government actors, which has been practiced in the 
Netherlands the last years. Of course there is an issue whether the tensions 
that would prevent smooth cooperation would not also hamper the possibility 
of concluding such an accord on joint style issues.  
 Do pay early attention to implementation matters. Given the complexity 
of the matter good preparation is very important. Next to the hydrological 
water system aspects also issues like the legitimacy and support under the 
inhabitants and land owners, the possibilities to acquire land and possible 
zoning planning barriers were issues that were not well previewed in the North 
and South Meene case. In the Breakthrough case exchange with critics was 
sought much more early, especially when the project ideas got more detailed.  
Do prepare your organisation for this boundary spanning task. It urges 
other very different capabilities compared to a ‘planning and producing’ mode. 
A high level of receptivity, including analytical capacity, is needed. This is not 
only a matter of preview, but also of capacity for learning while doing. 
“Corporate identities” like “contextual water management” might help to give 
individual waterboard officers a common perspective.  
 Do allow for careful assessment of the wishes of actors that are too 
manifold to be all involved in the process. While it gives these wishes more 
weight in the process, the greater advantage is that those wishes are 
channelled into more general purposes and that extreme wishes by extreme 
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representatives are recognized as such. Likewise value the potential of strong 
representing organisations to not only transfer demands, but also to mitigate 
and compromise on behalf of their members.  
 Do keep external communication early in the process, active, open and 
honest, without implying that it should not be well-organized at the same time. 
If you can, let already realized parts of the project speak for themselves. This 
implies: 
 Do start to realize parts of the project when you can when the risk that 
the rest will be made impossible after all is manageable. (This was actually 
discussed with practitioners as a dilemma, but they all agreed that a quick 
start with uncertainties involved was the preferred option. In the Breakthrough 
case we saw that it can indeed create momentum, while the EU subsidy 
forced hurry in the North and South Meene in this respects also worked out 
quite well, creating the atmosphere with the remaining critics that this was 
goling to be realized one way or another).   
 Do keep the purposes that cannot be realised on the agenda. 
Circumstances develop, and what cannot be realised now might meet better 
conditions further in the process.  
 
Don’ts 
Don’t make very substantial promises in the heat of the debate, without 
having consulted the organisation’s experts on their feasibility, like happened 
in the beginning of the North and South Meene case. In an era of “output 
based legitimacy” this might be very dangerous. 
Don’t forget when involved in a congenial and consultative process that 
there might be issues that need to involve other sectors with actors with very 
different orientations towards rules and hierarchy.  
Don’t try to do everything alone, when there are ally’s that will do the 
job (almost) as good as you. When there is a complex setup of authorities and 
responsibilities, try to be a team player that leave room for the others to 
‘score’. (And do show solidarity with your ally’s, like in the Breakthrough case 
when a waterboard official found himself in a position to defend the value of 
the ecological highway component of the project.)  
Don’t leave out and frustrate actors that you will definitively need later. 
 
Dilemmas 
Many do’s and don’ts are a bit ambiguous. For they represent not a “the more 
so, the better” kind of modus. Therefore it is both realistic and useful to 
complement them with dilemma’s that have to be considered by central actors 
in boundary spanning processes.   
(1) Boundary spanning enables actions that would not have been 
possible when each actor would have remained to operate in its own domain. 
So-called “win-win situations” do actually occur. But, the strife for such can 
also raise expectations making real achievements as unsatisfactory to many 
actors as would have been the case otherwise. In this case we have seen 
some of this when the unconditional promise of the waterboard chairman in 
the North and South Meene case raised expectations that were not fulfilled by 
the first plan for the area and even led to distrust. 
 (2) Adaptive implementation is a requirement for fruitful cooperation 
across boundaries, but when not carefully guarded the “finding our way 
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together” approach may lead to outcomes that in hindsight do absolutely not 
match with the essential purposes or even responsibilities of actors involved. 
Co-production and flexibility than become “drifting” and a lack of 
perseverance. In the North and South Meene case this point could be 
illustrated by the disappearance of nature development from the plans, while 
in the beginning (and even more in previous white papers where the idea of a 
retention area was drawn from!) this seemed to be one of the essentials of the 
project.  
 (3) Related but different is the issue that agreements – involving 
compromises – reached in cooperation with other actors can be hard to 
defend in each actor’s own organisation. In the North and South Meene case 
the extra costs of compromising with the inhabitants were met with great 
scepticism by the council of the waterboard. The governing board even feared 
a political crisis that ultimately could be averted. Fearing that the neglect of 
zoning plan requirements would be indefensible in his own organisation, the 
representative of the municipality got to his intervention. 
 (4) Interacting with other actors in an informal and one to one way can 
be much faster and more productive than working with larger and more 
formalized decision making structures. But the risk can be that the partner has 
not understood what was agreed in the same way, or that multiple one to one 
sessions among different partners create chaos, or that gossip on third parties 
rather than productive agreements get to fuel the informal contacts. 
Furthermore, when money is committed the basis should be firm. In the North 
and South Meene case the forced hurry and open end contracts were fuelling 
a lot of unrest later on.  
 (5) Sharing responsibilities not only implies that the credits for success 
are to be shared, but more importantly that the clarity of responsibilities can 
be blurred, while at the same time actors engage in new dependencies. In the 
North and South Meene case the waterboard was tempted to conclude rather 
early in the process a contract with a consultancy to plan and guide the 
building process. This was partially done to be able to satisfy subsidy 
requirements. But when difficulties arose it showed that there was a lot 
unclear about the division of responsibilities. In the Breakthrough case in 
terms of area and money it has become more a nature development than a 
water project. Nevertheless the waterboard is by far the most active, 
compared to the province.  
 (6) Sharing resources gives a similar picture. It fits the idea of joint 
boundary spanning processes, but might lead to high transaction costs and 
path dependencies, that even can be misused for strategic behaviour and 
blackmail when the process turns to flow in a less congenial river bed, 
especially when the dependency is not really mutual. In the North and South 
Meene case it was mentioned as one of the reasons not to try very hard to 
involve German locations in the location choice for retention areas. Would the 
German authorities really agree about their task when the water burbles the 
dikes? Or would they interpret the situation differently, leaving the waterboard 
powerless? Another example is that time requirements caused the need to 
have more operations in parallel, negotiating, planning and building at the 
same time and adjusting those to one another. While in principle this is an 
interesting option, it also caused problems for the controllability of the 
process.  
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